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Preface  
	  
This thesis really started in July 2015, I just did not know it then. I remember when my 
mom told me that we were going to Greece; I remember exactly where I was standing in her 
office, immediately excited, anxious, annoyed. My mom, a Spanish professor at Skidmore 
College, also concentrates on US-Mexico border studies. She had signed up for the University of 
the Aegean’s July 2015 course on migration in Lesvos, Greece in the interest of gaining an 
international and comparative understanding of migration studies, and I was coming along. Like 
anything my mom tended to do when I was in high school, I found a reason to be bothered by it. 
“Mom!” I cried, “It’s my last summer home before college. I don’t want to go to Greece!” 
Famous last words.  
I now look back at the way I protested and I blush, humored and embarrassed. While in 
Greece, I did not attend many classes with my mom, nor did I realize I had any particular interest 
in what she was studying. But I now understand that trip as a turning point, one that paved the 
course of my academic career and personal interests. One class I did attend with my mom was 
focused on the topic of agency. I distinctly remember being confused by the discussion. 
Truthfully, I still find the topic confusing, and even at the onset of writing this thesis, it was not 
something I had considered writing about. It was not until it naturally arose as a point of 
discussion in this project that I even remembered that class in Lesvos, realizing that the 
unanswered questions I had then have actually not left me at all. 
Among the professors on the summer program was Heath Cabot, who serves as one of 
the evaluators on the committee for this thesis. In Lesvos, I told Professor Cabot that I would be 
attending Bates College in the fall, and she told me that she knew an anthropology professor 
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there by the name of Danny Danforth. Arriving to Bates, I met Danny, who has been my advisor 
for the past four years and is someone with whom I have found a shared passion for Greece. In 
one of the first meetings I had with Danny as a freshman, I recounted my summer experience. 
Afterward, he said something along the lines of “Maybe you will write your senior thesis on 
refugees and Greece.” In my head I was thinking, Maybe, but probably not.  
My travels to Greece continued, somewhat serendipitously, over the next four years of 
college. As a classics major, I spent the summer after my freshman year on an archaeological 
program that traveled around Greece, inspired by mysteries of the ancient Aegean. The summer 
after my sophomore year, the opportunity arose again to return to Greece. This time, it was for a 
short summer course at the European Cultural Centre of Delphi. I arrived in mid-June, the 
youngest of the bunch and one of only two Americans. Amongst a cohort of Greek graduate and 
PhD students, we engaged in seminars on philosophy, political science, and history, centered on 
understanding crisis. During my time there, I learned many things, but one of the most important 
lessons was that I needed to go back.   
The following year, I lived in Athens for seven months. For the winter semester of my 
junior year, I lived with Mima and Lucas, two people whose love and laughter I still think about 
every day. During this time, I volunteered with a humanitarian co-operative foundation that 
offers daily meals, classes, services, and communal space to asylum-seekers, refugees, and 
migrants. For the summer, I lived by myself while developing and teaching an English language 
curriculum at a local NGO for unaccompanied refugee minors. These experiences entirely 
changed my perspective on the process of learning and the power of human connection.  
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Returning to Bates this past fall, I did not know exactly on what I would write my thesis, 
only that maybe Danny, those years ago, had been spot-on. I still have more theory to read, more 
Greek to learn (σιγά-σιγά), more understanding to undertake. Looking back over the course of 
the last four years, I am still blushing, humored, embarrassed; but I am also excited for what 
other lessons lie ahead. Most of all, I am grateful for the people who have guided me along the 
way. This thesis is not only a culmination of my academic career at Bates College, but a product 
of personal reflection, and could not have been done without the people that have supported me 
since the beginning.  
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Abstract 
	  
This thesis focuses on the historical, social, and political constructions of the category of the 
refugee, specifically focusing on the recent “refugee crisis” in Greece. In the nearly seventy 
years since the UNHCR’s 1951 Convention, the historically determined definition of the refugee 
has yet to change in accordance with the political and geographic landscapes of the world. As a 
result, the lack of parallel between legal frameworks and the increased global flow of refugees 
have catalyzed protracted refugee situations. In the wake of the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement, one 
such protracted situation has emerged in Greece. As of Winter 2019, nearly 15,000 thousand 
individuals seeking asylum are being held on the Greek “hotspot” islands of Lesvos, Chios, 
Samos, Leros, and Kos due to the country’s “containment policy.” The response to the migration 
“crisis,” in addition to the neoliberal management of the country’s economic depression, 
contextualize the space for communication and agency in the public sphere. Employing critical 
and anthropological theory, this thesis explores the permissible forms of communication and 
existing actors included in the public sphere, and how this in turn affects the agency and 
representation of asylum-seekers, migrants, and refugees in Greece. In particular, this thesis 
focuses on how solidarity initiatives which seek to dismantle traditional hierarchical dynamics of 
humanitarian aid not only work to bolster the agency of those they aid, but also renegotiate the 
realms of the “social” and the “political.” 
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Introduction 
	  
Lesvos, Greece 
July 15 2015 
“They do this every day at this time,” the woman said, turning back to the group. 
The clanging on the metal fence was growing louder between the din of chants 
and yells. We were standing in the shade of a building, higher up on a hill than 
the source of the clamor below. She told us that they do it as a protest, but that 
their claims can’t be processed any faster. There are too many people, coming too 
fast. Looking down at Moria Refugee Camp, I saw bundles of black mesh fabric 
folding like the tops of tents. Is that what they use for olive trees? I thought. After 
a few minutes, the group moved down away from the building and into a cleared 
space. The sun glared bright off the white, dusty ground. I turned to see two boys, 
about my age, speaking to a woman in our group. What were they speaking? Not 
Greek. Arabic? Farsi? One of them extended his hand; they were offering us 
watermelon. 
 
When we arrived in July 2015, the spotlight of international attention was on Greece. 
While playing a significant role in the world financial “crisis” that began in 2008, the first days 
of July 2015 in Greece were marked by anticipation of the country’s monumental referendum 
vote on whether to accept another bailout program. At the same time, an unprecedented number 
of people fleeing violence, persecution, and poverty were navigating the Mediterranean, reaching 
the shores of Greek islands. One of those islands, Lesvos, has since become one of the 
“hotspots” of the “refugee crisis.” In particular, the Moria Refugee Camp on the island of Lesvos 
has become known as one of the world’s most overcrowded, unsafe, and unsanitary refugee 
camps. Moria has also become a visible representation of debate in the wake of the “refugee 
crisis” in Europe:  hardening stances on immigration countered by the moral and political 
responsibility of protecting human rights. In the nearly four years since I visited Moria with a 
group of anthropology students at the University of the Aegean, the camp’s conditions have 
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increasingly deteriorated. This has been exacerbated by the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement, the 
consequences of which have stranded some 15,000 people on various Greek islands providing 
the closest landing point in the EU for migrants and asylum-seekers arriving from Turkey.  As I 
write in 2019, Greece remains in the midst of two “crises;” though the last round of EU-enforced 
austerity measures were implemented in August 2018, the country continues to move toward 
economic recovery while responding to the “refugee crisis.” 
   In this thesis, I do not use quotes around “crisis” in every instance of the its usage, but I 
do want to emphasize the particular meaning of the word. Though the word “crisis” in English 
implies an isolated instance of emergency, the lived experience of crisis extends beyond the 
temporal limitations implied by a saying such as “a moment of crisis.” As argued by Peter 
Redfield (2005) and further articulated by Heath Cabot (2014), crisis is a significant rupture that 
not only demands response, but invokes a particular narrative. Today in Greece, this narrative 
conveys that crisis is no longer conceived as a liminal space between normalcy and disorder 
catalyzed by a singular breach in the system. Rather, crisis contours a new normal. The 
overlapping economic and refugee crises (see Cabot 2018) have contextualized the lives of 
individuals beyond a singular instance evoked by the English word “crisis,” and into lived 
experiences that constitute the everyday.  
     Further, I do not so much present a linear argument of how the “refugee crisis” in Greece 
can be understood, but rather, I endeavor to present an open space for a critical discussion. In 
other words, I wrote this thesis with the intention to present a certain perspective of “crisis” in 
Greece from my understanding as an undergraduate American student.  From this vantage—a 
young white woman who has spent time in Greece over the past four years—I want to offer a 
discussion of the refugee “crisis” through the lenses of anthropological and critical theory. I also 
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want to also address the sensitive subject matter of writing a thesis on refugees. From the onset 
of the thesis process, I have been aware of the potential pitfalls, both academic and ethical, of 
writing about refugees. The word “refugee,” which I discuss in more detail in Chapter 1, comes 
with a certain meaning, especially in the context of a global refugee crisis. The “refugee” is a 
product of the nation-state system, a category into which an individual is recognized if they fall 
within the parameters of the UNHCR’s 1951 definition.  Not only does essentializing or 
conceiving “refugees” in a categorical sense undermine the individual identities and lives of 
those who fall under its definition, but also implies a set of potential issues regarding predisposed 
assumptions on their behalf. In this thesis, I do not undertake a role of presenting on behalf of 
“refugees.” Instead, I approach the discussion of the “refugee crisis” using theoretical lenses to 
consider agency and communication in the public sphere. 
 In terms of ethnography, I was conscious of what was both ethical and appropriate to 
share. I did not engage in extended formal field work in Greece and because of this, I included 
only my personal experiences. A majority of the ethnographic material in this thesis comes from 
published newspaper articles and information available online, and I make reference to the 
proper sources. In terms of personal accounts, I include a first-person narrative that is either 
woven into the body of the text or condensed in short paragraphs at the start of certain sections. 
In this way, I intended to acknowledge my reflexivity and emphasize the subjectivity of my 
accounts in order to speak only from my behalf the truths that I have learned and that I have 
experienced. In instances of translating or transliterating Greek, I have followed the guidelines 
presented by the Modern Greek Studies Association, and the advice of my advisor, Danny 
Danforth, a speaker of Greek. 
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 In Chapter 1, I discuss the International Refugee Regime and the historical development 
of the category of the refugee alongside the advent of the nation-state. In addition, I situate the 
global “refugee crisis” in the context of Europe before focusing more specifically on Greece in 
Chapter 2, providing an overview of recent history and events of both the economic and refugee 
crises.  I have, however, excluded a detailed discussion on the role of Europeanization in Greece 
in the body of this thesis. Before the emergence of recent “crises” in Greece, the country 
experienced rapid change; in 2000 the Athens metro began operation and in 2001 a new airport 
was constructed, both as precursors to the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens (Rozakou 2016: 80). 
Additionally, Greece joined the Eurozone in 2002, replacing the drachma with the euro. 
Considering Europeanization as it pertains to the “asylum crisis” in 2014, Heath Cabot raises 
questions that are still pertinent in a discussion of the refugee crisis in Greece today. She writes, 
“The krisi of asylum makes visible a number of underlying and perhaps irresolvable tensions in 
Europeanization and rights politics more broadly: how to reconcile humanitarian and security 
concerns, how to distinguish refugees from other kinds of migrants, how to rearticulate the 
insides and outsides of the Greek nation-state, and the question of what kind of polities Greece 
and Europe are becoming” (2014:6). 
         In Chapter 3, I turn to a review of scholarship on refugee studies using Giorgio 
Agamben’s theoretical approach as an axis of discussion. Agamben’s (1998) theory of bare life, 
an extension of Michel Foucault’s (1990, 2003) discussion of biopolitics, also draws from 
Hannah Arendt’s (1958) discussion on the Aristotelean concepts of the bios and the zoe, the 
separate realms of political and biological life. Before detailing these approaches, I briefly 
survey scholarship on liminality and disorder (van Gennep 1960, Douglas 1966, Turner 1967) in 
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order to discuss the liminal category of the refugee and its place in Lissa Mallki’s (1995a) 
“national order of things.”  
Toward the end of Chapter 3, I apply these theoretical frameworks to the refugee crisis in 
Greece, specifically looking at the Moria Refugee Camp on the island on Lesvos, as well as 
Greece’s containment policy that inhibits asylum-seekers and migrants on the islands from 
traveling to the mainland. Additionally, I turn the discussion to how the public sphere in Greece 
is contextualized by the neoliberal management of crises. In Chapter 4, I focus on this discussion 
in more depth, as well, I bring into the fold questions about agency, agonism, and 
communicative ability for marginalized voices into the fold in the wake of overlapping crises. 
Pointing out polarized voices in the public, from the neo-Nazi party, Golden Dawn, to solidarity 
movements that work to dismantle hierarchical relationships of reciprocity, I focus on how 
debate in the public sphere includes or excludes the voices of refugees, migrants, and asylum-
seekers in Greece. I conclude by looking at solidarity initiatives as spaces that allow for a 
renegotiation of the “social” and the “political,” drawing links between Agamben and Arendt’s 
theories. I end by posing questions for further analysis on the relationship between recognition 
and agency. 
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Chapter 1: The International Refugee Regime 
	  
The term “refugee” shall apply to any person who… Owing to well-founded fear 
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of 
the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside 
the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable 
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 
UNHCR 1951, Article 1(A)(2) 
The International Refugee Regime has developed alongside the modern nation-state and 
the movement of people across international borders. Over many iterations, the regime has been 
characterized by the state of the international community. Since the Westphalian state’s 
inception in 1648, the international status of refugees and states’ obligations towards them have 
shifted in responses to globalization. In 2019, the regime’s lynchpin remains the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. There are a reported 68.5 million displaced 
peoples in the world today, 25.4 million of whom are refugees, more than half of them are 
children (UNHCR 2018).  
In the nearly seventy years since the Convention, the historically determined definition of 
the refugee has yet to change in accordance with political and geographic landscape of the world. 
As a result, the lack of parallel between legal frameworks and the increased global flow of 
refugees has catalyzed protracted refugee situations. Defined as a circumstance “in which 
refugees find themselves in a long - standing and intractable state of limbo” (UNHCR 2007), the 
current refugee regime is characterized by an absence of durable solutions, exacerbated by 
ineffective responsibility-sharing of states on a global level (Aleinikoff 2017).  
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In the wake of World War II, the victorious Allied powers mediated the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees in order to negotiate the internationally recognized status of 
the millions of displaced people. Initially, the Convention’s framework for refugees was 
restricted to Europe, designed to protect the millions of displaced peoples from WWII. The 
temporal and geographic restrictions on the 1951 definition were lifted in the 1967 Protocol 
(FitzGerald and Arar 2018: 390). Additionally, the Protocol established the principle of non-
refoulement, preventing states from returning refugees to the countries in which they were 
persecuted. Both the Convention and the Protocol establish the fundamental guidelines for 
defining international refugee status.  
The category of the refugee is distinguished from other migrants in that it applies to those 
crossing an international border due to a fear of persecution. The 1951 definition of a refugee 
stipulates that a person must possess a well-founded fear of persecution that is based on race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. This definition 
does not include migrants crossing international borders in search of refuge from poverty, global 
warming, or development. In such cases, the term “irregular migration” is most often used to 
describe the movement of migrants that does not fall within the purview of the 1951 refugee 
definition. The definition also fails to include protection for Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs), 
persons uprooted and moving within a country’s borders. Further, when parsing the 1951 
definition more closely, persons fleeing from conflict or violence are not explicitly covered by 
the Convention. However, in the current regime, states have recognized and accepted this as a 
credible reason to claim asylum.  
The category of the refugee is also distinguished from that of the asylum-seeker. 
According to the UNHCR (2016), “the terms asylum seeker and refugee are often confused: an 
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asylum-seeker is someone who says he or she is a refugee, but whose claim has not yet been 
definitively evaluated.” All asylum-seekers are not refugees, yet all refugees were at some point 
asylum-seekers (Amnesty International 2018). In situations of mass migration, it is not always 
procedurally possible to conduct individual interviews. Thus, asylum-seekers are often referred 
to as “prima facie,” meaning at first appearance, refugees (UNHCR 2019). While the UNHCR 
primarily targets aid to asylum-seekers and refugees, stateless peoples and internally displaced 
peoples safeguards often fall within the frameworks of individual states. IDPs, the people whom 
the UNHCR defines as “on the run at home” (UNHCR 2018), were not defined as refugees in an 
attempt by the Convention to maintain the Westphalian nation-state system (FitzGerald and Arar 
2018).  
The 1648 Peace of Westphalia is considered the beginning of the modern nation-state 
system. Outlining the exclusive sovereignty of individual states, the implications of the treaty 
hardened international borders, enmeshing the movement of people with the politicization of 
territorial boundaries (Barnett 2002). After Westphalia, eighteenth century scholars such as Emer 
de Vattel studied the legal frameworks outlining the status of people moving between recently 
drafted international boundaries (Chetail 2016). The legal responses to migration were outlined 
by normative conceptions formulated on de Vattel’s legal and political philosophy. Yet, from its 
beginnings, the International Refugee Regime has been politically entrenched in ad hoc 
responses (Barnett 2002). Without an international protocol to leverage refugee rights from the 
beginning of the nation-state system, countries were left to react to people who came across their 
borders at their own discretion. Further, as the category of a refugee in the modern sense had yet 
to be created, examples of refugees from pre-1951 are defined within a post-1951 understanding. 
One such case is that of the Huguenots fleeing religious persecution in France in the seventeenth 
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century. While the English word for “refugee” was first used in response to the Huguenots 
arriving in England (FitzGerald and Arar 2018), it had yet to embody the social and political 
meaning it inherently does today.  
In the early twentieth century, ad hoc measures continued and the label of refugee was 
applied to various groups who evoked a need for protection (FitzGerald and Arar 2018). In the 
wake of the World Wars and the mass migration that it incited, it became clear that a 
comprehensive standard for refugee protection was necessary. In response to World War I, the 
League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was established in 1921, serving as the 
precursor for the later established UNHCR. When the League of Nations dissolved at the end of 
World War II and the United Nations (UN) took its place, the International Refugee 
Organization (IRO) was created in 1948 to manage “victims of Nazi, fascist, or similar regimes” 
(Barnett 2002). Although Europe-oriented, the framework of the IRO provided a clear basis for a 
refugee identity, working with the specific parameters of the problem. In 1951, with many of the 
displaced peoples in Europe since the WWII remaining unsettled, the UNHCR was created to 
take over the IRO. Though broadening the scope from the IRO’s specific definition, the 
Convention took into account the failure of the Allied powers to prevent the Holocaust, and thus 
prioritizes persecution over environmental or economic factors. Further, the Convention’s 
definition against political regimes fit within the aims of the Cold War, as communist 
governments could often be cited as violating human rights.   
As an independent agency working within the United Nations, the UNHCR serves as a 
supervisor on the application of international treaties and is the caretaker of the 1951 
Convention. Though the Convention is the only international legal charter that specifically 
protects refugees, the implementation of UNHCR policy is contingent upon the cooperation of 
	  
17 
	  
signatory states to recognize asylum and provide protection for refugees (Betts 2009). 
Consequently, the UNHCR is left at a crossroads of respecting state sovereignty and assuming 
full international responsibility.  
In addition to abolishing the temporal and geographic limitations of the 1951 Convention, 
the 1967 Protocol reaffirmed the fundamental principles of the right to seek asylum and non-
refoulement. Outlined in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, the principle of non-refoulement 
states that:  
No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his [or her] life or freedom would 
be threatened on account of his [or her] race, religion, nationality, membership of 
a particular social group or political opinion.” 
 UNHCR 1951, Article 33(1) 
Therefore, signatory states are left with three other ‘durable solutions’ for managing refugees: 
repatriation, resettlement, or local integration (Betts & Collier 2017). The path of repatriation 
when conflict ends in a person’s home country is almost entirely restricted in the current 
geopolitical climate, and as states do not often bear the burden of providing a path to citizenship 
and integration for refugees, the route of local integration is selectively limited. The third option 
of resettlement requires refugees to be placed in a “safe third country.” The safety of a third party 
country is not only predicated on respecting the principle of non-refoulement, but meeting 
additional standards outlined in the Convention, such as ensuring refugees access to economic 
and educational opportunities. Though the principle of non-refoulement is enshrined as a positive 
legal concept for the protection for refugees, it is also now considered a jus cogens norm of 
international law (Farmer 2008). In other words, non-refoulement has become an unconditional 
legal custom, foundational to the way in which states operate. The UNHCR also encourages this, 
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stressing that the principle of a “safe third country” is a common function between states, and not 
only a contract of higher international law (Christophersen 2016). Resettlement into a third 
country has been most recently highlighted by the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement, but with a lack of 
international responsibility sharing and inherent pitfalls in “safe third countries,” refugees are 
often left without access to any of the three solutions. Exhausting these conventional pathways, 
protracted situations have increased, and refugees are faced with residing long-term in camps or 
living in cities where they are often prevented from entering the local economic system. As a 
result, the effective enforcement of the current refugee regime relies heavily on longstanding 
efforts of humanitarian aid supported by International Government Organizations (IGOs) and 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) (Betts & Collier 2018: 8).  
The three solutions of repatriation, resettlement, and local integration are designed to 
ensure that refugees have the right to asylum in a timely manner, grating them a durable solution 
to an otherwise indefinite interim between states (Betts 2009). This has been entirely undermined 
by protracted situations in which refugees are marginalized in camps and cities for years. As of 
2015, fewer than 300,000 refugees worldwide accessed one of the three durable solutions, and 
the UNHCR recognized thirty-two separate protracted refugee situations globally (Betts & 
Collier 2018: 54). In the most substantial case, Kenya’s Dadaab refugee camp is home to a third 
generation of refugees (Marshall 2016). Now in its twenty-seventh year, there are grandchildren 
of refugees who arrived in Dadaab nearly thirty years ago (Ibid.). This limbo in which refugees 
are suspended between state hood is described by political scientist Alex Aleinikoff as a “second 
exile,” wherein refugees are excluded from the right to work or move freely within the host 
country (Aleinikoff & Zamore 2018).  
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Since the 1980s, the model of the camp has been the principle tool in refugee assistance, 
often obstructing refugee integration and perpetuating long-term residence (FitzGerald and Arar 
2018, Betts & Collier 2017, Malkki 1995a). The camp acts a method by which host countries can 
more easily marginalize refugees, isolating them both physically and socially from urban, 
economic centers (Ibid.). Currently, most refugees live in urban areas outside of camps, which 
provides its own set of integration challenges. The priority of the UNHCR, as of a 2009 policy 
on urban refugees, is to forge a path towards self reliance (UNHCR 2009). Yet, urban refugees 
are often not provided with access to the formal economy and subsequently subjected to labor 
exploitation (Jacobson 2006). Even special economic zones (SEZs), such as those in Jordan that 
incentivize investment through special economic regulations, are not a substantial solution to 
integrating refugees into local economies. While scholars Alexander Betts and Paul Collier see 
SEZs as a model towards a solution for refugee integration (Betts & Collier 2017), these alone 
fail to remedy the complex realities of economic exploitation (Crawley 2017). While SEZs serve 
as a means to establish livelihood in some instances, these zones still restrict refugees from 
accessible education and more skilled labor markets. While failing to mend to heart of the 
problem of economic integration (Staton 2016), protracted situations and the unattainability of 
durable solutions leaves gaps in securities for refugees when arriving in host countries.  
The Current Regime  
	  
In the initial drafting of the 1951 Convention, protections for refugees were oriented to 
their rights once in host countries (Aleinikoff 2017). Initially framed within a Euro-centric 
paradigm, the Convention’s procedure—albeit the 1967 Protocol’s expansion—has not changed 
with respect to the increased global migrant flows. The regime is faltering, failing to ensure the 
basic rights defined in the Convention such as a right to work, education, and movement within a 
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host country. Moreover, states have acquired responsibility for refugees by proximity, leaving 
host countries who are unable to provide stability even for their own citizens unable to deliver on 
sustainable refugee solutions (Aleinikoff 2017). In many of these situations, the rights 
guaranteed by the Convention to refugees are routinely violated. For example, Greece’s 
economic depression is coinciding with the European refugee crisis. The overlap of a financial 
collapse and a surge of migrants at the edges of the Aegean have contributed to an unresolved 
protracted refugee situation. In effect, “secondary movements” have increasingly become an 
alternative to residing in cities and camps in Greece. These continued journeys, embarked on 
with the help of smugglers through Balkan countries to Northern and Western Europe, are 
“impelled by the inadequacies of the global protection system” (Betts & Collier 2017: 55). The 
current refugee regime neglects the intended protection of rights by the Convention for refugees 
in host states, and is instead characterized by suspended protections and state interests.  
 The definition of a refugee provided by the UNHCR gives leeway for particular political 
interests to determine the “well-founded fear” of people seeking asylum. The term “regime” is 
itself indicative of the collective incentive states have in their participation (Betts 2009). The 
Convention leaves the status of a refugee at a state’s discretion, rather than the individual’s. This 
therefore allows for states to select who falls within these criteria, which, at the time of its 
conception and still arguably today, is “deeply embedded in the economic and ethnoracial 
preferences of existing laws” (FitzGerald and Arar 2018: 389). The use of the word 
“persecution” in the 1951 definition implies subjugation of an individual that occurs within the 
public sphere, as opposed to the private (Barnett 2002). In other words, the 1951 measure of 
persecution assumes a form of public persecution, rather than an offense against someone in their 
private life. Additionally, though states have come to adopt persons fleeing from violence or 
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conflict as a credible basis of asylum, it is not technically included in the 1951 Convention. This 
“war-flaw” does not offer explicit responses to those fleeing armed conflict and other forms of 
widespread violence (Storey 2012). Though urged by the UNHCR for “people fleeing war to be 
considered refugees,” governments are not bound by a unilateral clause in the Convention that 
obliges them to do so. These narrowing factors are barriers to those suffering persecution and 
violence at the hands of non-governing political bodies, as well as those faced with life-
threatening economic or environmental insecurities. Furthermore, the UNHCR 2011 handbook 
explaining the category of the refugee states:  
“A person is a refugee within the meaning of the 1951 Convention as soon as he 
fulfils the criteria contained in the definition. This would necessarily occur prior 
to the time at which his refugee status is formally determined. Recognition of his 
refugee status does not therefore make him a refugee but declares him to be one. 
He does not become a refugee because of recognition, but is recognized because 
he is a refugee.” 
UNHCR 2011, Ch. 1, paragraph 28 
This posits the “refugee” as an “an ontologically given category existing in the real world, 
waiting to be seen for who they are” (FitzGerald and Arar 2018: 392). Bringing into the fold 
broader questions of human rights, it questions whether they exist a priori or as a socially 
constructed contract between citizen and sovereign. The tension between human rights as 
inalienable or constructed illuminates the paradoxical nature of the UNHCR as an apolitical 
body. Article 2 of the 1951 Convention reads “The work of the High Commissioner shall be of 
an entirely non-political character; it shall be humanitarian and social and shall relate, as a rule, 
to groups and categories of refugees” (UNHCR 1951).  
By declaring themselves as such, the UNHCR implies that their services are provided not 
on the basis of having an affiliation with a certain state or side of a conflict. While this point is 
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evident, the UNHCR maneuvers within the nation-state system, as opposed to above it. In 
providing humanitarian aid, the UNHCR is still forced to rely on the cooperation of its delegates 
and thus is inherently bound to their interests. For example, a large part of its funding comes 
from state government contributions and the European Union; of the $3.338 billion it received in 
2014, less than $120 million came from the funding of the United Nations (Maley 2016). With 
this, in tandem with the concept of human rights as malleable and administered at the hand of 
governing bodies (Frezzo 2015), it becomes evident that the UNHCR is involved in the inherent 
political schematization of the International Refugee Regime.  
Though narrowly defined, the term refugee is complicatedly complex in both social and 
political realms. In the legal sphere, people who have lost the protection that their initial 
nationality ensured become recognized as a type of non-citizen. The UNHCR, therefore, 
becomes a proxy by which the human rights of these people are transferred. When the social 
contract between state and citizen is broken and the rights of citizens are no longer ensured, the 
inter-state or state-less status of persons is protected by their inclusion in the category of refugee. 
As articulated in the 2011 UNHCR handbook, the conferring of this category on someone does 
not make them a refugee; it recognizes the category in which they already are located. This 
approach presents the refugee as a category naturally existent within the Westphalian system, 
within which one is included after crossing an international boundary in fear of persecution. 
Thus, being a refugee is a liminal category, suspended between state hoods and the options of 
resettlement, repatriation, and local integration. With increasingly protracted situations, the 
current refugee regime has shifted the category of the refugee towards a more permanent status, 
within which people spend years in marginalized limbo. In the midst of the recent regime and 
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lack of international burden-sharing to provide adequate solutions, being a refugee has extended 
beyond a temporary category and into a prolonged social identity.  
While the responsibility of the UNHCR extends internationally, it becomes entangled in 
the politics of region to region and country to country in the “changing nature of displacement” 
(Feller 2001). The UNHCR serves as the guardian of the obligations to which states are expected 
to adhere, giving space for states to renegotiate their standards. With a rise of xenophobia and 
populist leaders in European countries, some states are drawing a harder line on immigration. 
The implications of this are seen legally and politically, as fewer people seeking asylum are 
granted it, and socially as public anti-immigration sentiments increase.  
The European Refugee Crisis 
	  
In September 2015, the image of Alan Kurdi brought international attention and an 
outpouring of public concern for the European refugee crisis. Washed up on a sandy Turkish 
shore, the three-year-old boy drowned after a rubber boat carrying Syrian refugees capsized near 
the Greek island, Kos (Cole 2017). The week that the heart-breaking photo was released, 
donations to charitable organizations around the world swelled; one study calculated that 
donations to the Swedish Red Cross campaign for Syrian refugees increased fifty-five times 
(Ibid.). The visceral reality of a child who died in an attempt to reach safe shores elicited a global 
response, putting the face of innocence to the growing crisis (Ticktin 2016).  
Yet, since 2015, immigration remains a divisive and complicated issue throughout 
Europe. New asylum claims have been cut in half since 2015, with some 645,000 claims filed by 
the end of 2017 and seekers primarily coming from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan (UNHCR). 
Despite a drastic reduction in immigration over the past three years, there has been a recent surge 
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of anti-immigrant and Far Right parties gaining political footholds in Europe. In December 2018, 
more than five thousand anti-immigrant protestors clashed with police in Brussel outside the EU 
headquarters just two days before the adoption of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and 
Regular Migration, by the UN Assembly (Paris 2018). A long negotiated document designed to 
share migration responsibilities, the Compact is committed to “our common understanding, 
shared responsibilities and unity of purpose regarding migration, making it work for all” (UN 
2018). With some European states voting against it, as well as a lack of confidence in its 
substantive effect from political commentators, the Compact raises questions about how Europe 
will proceed towards a cohesive immigration policy in the coming years. 
In 2015 and the first months of 2016, nearly 1.2 million migrants arrived in Europe 
(UNHCR 2019). Though migration to Europe is not a new phenomenon, the recent “European 
refugee crisis” can be traced back to violence in Syria beginning 2011. Though this conflict 
initiated the surge of migration from Syria, and many fleeing this conflict constitute a large 
number of the asylum-seekers and refugees in Europe today, the overwhelming migration to 
Europe in recent years has also come from other countries in the Middle East and Africa.  
The large scale numbers of refugees fleeing to Europe has been met with disparate 
responses.  The structure of the European Union and the Schengen Zone presented a complex set 
of challenges for a standardized response to the crises. In 1999, the Schengen Agreement was 
incorporated into the legal framework of the European Union, removing border controls between 
member countries and allowing freedom of movement within a large part of the continent. While 
this proved advantageous for proponents of a more unified Europe, it presented immediate 
problems in terms of regulating immigration and refugee responses. Even with the drafting of the 
2000 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights including the right to asylum in accordance with the 
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1951 Convention (Article 18), the EU lacked a consistent governing framework on refugees, 
asylum-seekers, and migrants. To mitigate these issues and prevent a ‘race to the bottom’ within 
Europe, the Dublin Regulation was adapted in 2003 and 2013 (Betts & Collier 2017: 64). Dublin 
III, the current iteration of the regulation implemented in 2014, defines which state has the 
obligation to process asylum claims, requiring that an asylum-seeker be processed in the first 
country to which they arrive (Ammirati 2015). 
            In 2014, when Dublin III was implemented, the number of refugees coming from Syria to 
Europe had yet to rise to unprecedented levels. Over the next years as the crisis peaked, frontline 
countries such as Italy and Greece had to accept a disproportionately higher number of refugees 
compared to more inland states. Though under the auspices of the Frontex, the EU’s border and 
coast guard agency is reliant upon member countries to provide its own equipment and border 
guards. With the Mediterranean Sea as a primary, and dangerous, entry point to Europe, Italy and 
Greece were automatically bound to register asylum claims from rescues at-sea. Those arriving 
in Europe are also required to register in Eurodac, the central European data bank. The system is 
designed to record fingerprints of all persons entering Europe and requesting asylum, and thus 
keep track of first-entry points (Ibid.). Under the guidelines of Dublin III, if a person is 
apprehended elsewhere in the European Union, he or she can be sent back to his or her country 
of entry. Even with Dublin Regulations in place, the reliance on member countries’ own 
facilitation of Frontex personnel and equipment, in addition to a sometimes faulty Eurodac 
system, the European Union’s response to migration lacks consistency. 
            From 2011 until 2015, nearly ten million people had already fled their homes due to the 
violence in Syria (Betts & Collier 2017: 73). Compounded by ethnic and interregional rivalries, 
extremist groups, and foreign involvement, the Syrian war is currently approaching its ninth 
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year, having already taken the lives of nearly 500,000 Syrians and displacing more than half of 
the country’s population (Aljazeera 2018). Initially, Syrians fled mostly to nearby Lebanon, 
Jordan, and Turkey. As the war escalated, more than one million refugees and migrants arrived 
on the shores of Greece in 2015, inundating the islands of Lesvos and Kos. (UNHCR 2015). As 
an overwhelming number of migrants landed on European shores, the cracks in the EU’s 
immigration system began to widen. Even as non-Schengen members, Balkan countries provided 
a route to the rest of Europe, and smuggling rapidly increased (Betts & Collier 2017: 82). 
Meanwhile, Hungary’s Far Right President Viktor Orban reacted to the large arrival of refugees 
to his country by building a border fence, diverting refugees to Austria and eventually to 
Germany. Though not their initial port of entry—breaking with Dublin III—Germany began 
accepting asylum claims, aware of both the staggering influx on an economically fragile Greece 
and also Germany’s own close history of a narrative that associates the country with extreme 
xenophobia in World War II. With Chancellor Angela Merkel’s decision to open the door to 
refugees in Germany, other EU member-states did not share the same stance nor agree to the 
resettlement of refugees within their borders. During the second half of 2015, the European 
Resettlement Scheme was implemented in an attempt to relocate refugees to different European 
countries. The scheme was ultimately ineffective at relieving pressure, especially from hotspot 
countries such as Greece and Italy (Niemann & Zaun 2018).  
 With an inconsistent enforcement of the Dublin Agreement, an internal solution in the 
EU to reinstate border regulations came instead from outsourcing border controls (Ibid., 90). 
Initially attempting to persuade Balkan countries like the Republic of North Macedonia to 
prevent passage to the rest of Europe from Greece, the EU’s search for an external solution came 
in the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement. Turkish President Erdogan, favorable to political incentives 
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such as “visa liberalization” and a €6 billion stipend, agreed to the deal implemented on March 
20, 2016. Still in affect, the key provisions of the deal states that any new “irregular migrants” 
will be sent back to Turkey, including those who have not applied for asylum or whose claims 
have been denied (Ibid., 8). Further, for every one Syrian resettled to Turkey from a Greek 
island, one Syrian from Turkey will be resettled in the EU, with the maximum number allowed 
resettlement set at 72,000. Turkey also agreed to cooperate in preventing any new sea or land 
routes for illegal migration into the EU.  
 This deal is both controversial and precarious. Turkey, although signing the 1951 
Convention, has not signed the 1967 Protocol. This means that it is not a signatory state obliged 
to the expansion of the Convention beyond Europe. Consequently, as reports from Amnesty 
International demonstrate, Turkey has moved Syrians back to Syria, breaking with the principle 
of non-refoulement (Amnesty International 2016). Moreover, a failed attempt to overthrow the 
government in 2016 provokes questions as to the nature of Turkey as a “safe third country.” The 
leveraging power between President Erdogan and the EU in the unregulated deal is also cause for 
alarm. Since 2016, the EU has withheld €3 billion from Turkey as a means of insurance, and 
President Erdogan is threatening to pull out of the deal if the money is not secured (Niemann & 
Zaun 2018). With refugees on Greek islands before March 20, 2016 excluded from the deal, 
there are now nearly 15,000 people trapped without the ability to travel to the mainland. The 
result is overcrowded camps on these islands, condemned as human rights violations, and riddled 
with dangerous conditions (New York Times 2018). 
 Notwithstanding the problematic consequences, the EU-Turkey deal has worked to 
reduce the number of migrants coming into Europe. Since 2015, the number has dropped ninety 
percent (NPR 2018). Even though there has been a reduction of migration to Europe, the global 
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flows of refugees have increased in recent years (UNHCR 2017). In response, the UN drafted the 
Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration in July of 2018. It passed the 
following December, despite seven countries not signing to document, including the EU states of 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. With their hard line anti-immigration stance, their 
vote against the Compact at the UN Assembly Meeting was unsurprising.  
Predicated on multilateral cooperation, the Compact outlines twenty-three objectives and 
ten guiding principles over the course of its thirty-four pages. Even as a non-binding agreement, 
critics of the Compact question its potential effectiveness and argue that it threatens state 
sovereignty (NPR 2018). This concern stems from the document’s commitment to “fulfil the 
human rights of all migrants, regardless of their migration status” (UN 2018). This concerns 
opponents who fear it will jeopardize state’s discretion of who is allowed to enter its borders. 
Conversely, Lousie Arbour, a UN specialist for intentional migration says that it is not a legally 
binding document, but rather, “it’s a framework for cooperation” (Risse 2018). Under the 
auspices of the Compact, there are no new obligations on states. Instead, it echoes existing 
protocol with an emphasis on international cooperation. Even as a non-binding agreement, its 
effective implementation will be contingent on state regulation. While this component may seem 
like the weak link of the agreement considering the binding 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, 
not only have many UN member states yet to sign both of those treaties, but even these ‘hard 
laws’ have not been unilaterally implemented without serving specific political interests.  
◆ 
 The limits of the International Refugee Regime are highlighted by the current level of 
protracted situations, exemplary of the selectivity and lack of burden sharing between states. 
Dealing with the aftermath of World War II, the 1951 Convention drafted a definition of the 
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refugee that was crafted with specific and Euro-centric challenges in mind. In the almost seventy 
years since the UNHCR’s inception, heightened globalization, widespread regional conflict, and 
the realities of global warming expose widening gaps in the Convention. Even with the recent 
passage of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration, states in Europe, and 
across the world, have no cohesive obligation or protocol for asylum and migration. The 
category of the refugee, though once intended to serve as a temporal status, has become a 
prolonged social identity that brings into question the nation-state system that defines it.  
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Chapter 2: Crisis in “Hotspot” Greece 
	  
Athens, Greece 
July 4, 2015 
It was my very first night in Athens. After a day of exploring the Acropolis, my 
mom and I found ourselves at a reading of Plato’s Apology, nestled in the back 
courtyard of an old house in Anafiotika. Tucked under the Acropolis’ 
northeastern slope, we were stumbling down the steps of the neighborhood’s 
narrow streets when we saw the sign and the open gate. Beneath the shadow of 
marble and moonlight, we watched the animated actor’s solo performance. 
Afterwards, he broke character, asking the audience to remain for some wine and 
a Socratic discussion. “We,” he paused, a genuine dramatic affect, “are 
experiencing history.” Silence hung still in the warm air. The seminar began and 
a microphone was passed around to anyone who wanted to speak about the 
impending referendum vote or the surge of refugees. At one point in the 
conversation, it became the turn of a man whose face I could not see. He cleared 
his throat. “It is the same question that Socrates had to answer: Shall he 
acquiesce to hegemony?...  He did not.”  
 
Though it has fallen from widespread international media attention since the monumental 
2015 referendum vote, the economic crisis in Greece has been described in a recent Washington 
Post headline as: “over only if you don’t live there” (O’Brien 2018). As a word, crisis implies the 
rupture of normal order and it demands critical response. As a lived experience, the break 
between normalcy and chaos, and the response to return to order, becomes more complicated. 
One of the things I remember most about my first night in Athens—besides Plato’s Apology—
was passing through the Syntagma metro station on our way home. Peering out of the car’s open 
doors, I could see that the entire station was packed full of people. They were making their way 
out of the platform and up the stairs to the city’s central square, mobilizing and demonstrating in 
response to the next day’s vote. Three years later, I recalled that memory one night at dinner with 
my host-family in Greece, remembering how little I knew about the nuances of the situation, and 
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how little I understood its importance. Both of my host parents nodded, perhaps also recalling 
where they were on that night, or contemplating what has happened since. My association with 
Greece’s economic crisis is flashing back to the moment of looking out the open metro doors, a 
somewhat instantaneous recollection. On the other hand, crisis is anything but—the years that 
have followed 2015 have been riddled with strict austerity measures, the loss of jobs, a shift in 
the way of life for many.  
While in the midst of financial collapse in 2015, Greece also became a “hotspot” in the 
European refugee crisis. With an already deteriorating economy and an existing asylum crisis 
(see Cabot 2014), Greece was inevitably unequipped to manage an unprecedented influx of 
refugees, let alone become an indefinite waiting zone for migrants and asylum seekers. Though 
the numbers of refugees arriving to Greece have dwindled since 2015, there remains an active 
overlap of crises (Cabot 2018). In order to better understand the how this came to be, I will 
sketch out the recent history of Greece’s economic breakdown.   
In the wake of the 2008 global financial recession, Greece became the epicenter of the 
European debt crisis. Since, Greece has yet to climb entirely out its financial depression, despite 
referendum votes, tax hikes, and an onslaught of austerity measures administered by the EU over 
the past ten years. Even though Greece’s official bailout program ended in August 2018, many 
aspects of the economy remain problematic. While no new austerity packages are set to be 
imposed, previous measures are still in place and unemployment rates are hovering near twenty 
percent. Evident in the aftermath of the 2008 collapse, the seeds of the current crisis were planted 
over a decade ago. Chastised by Northern European countries like Germany for overspending 
and avoiding taxes, stereotypes of the lazy Southern Europeans who lacked proper financial 
management skills were perpetuated. When in 2009 Greece announced its budget deficit was 
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nearly four times the EU’s limit, it became evident that Greece had been understating its debt for 
years, warding off investors and becoming the economic encumbrance of Europe. Having 
adopted the Euro in 2002, Greece lacked the ability to print more of its own currency as a means 
of inflating the country out of a crisis. As a result, it became beholden to the pressure of more 
economically dominant EU countries such as Germany.  
The first round of loans to support the Greek government came in 2010 from the 
International Monetary Fund—one third of the European troika—alongside the European Central 
Bank (ECB). With austerity measures and tax increases as stipulations of the bailouts, the 
economic instability in Greece came to a head in the summer of 2015. The then-newly elected 
Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras of the leftist SYRIZA party had run on a popular platform of 
fighting the strict austerity terms. He eventually called a referendum vote in July 2015 to either 
accept or reject the latest fiscal demands of the EU. While the ballot options were either “yes” or 
“no,” the underlying issues at hand were much more complex. The outcome of the vote held the 
potential of a “Grexit”—Greece exiting the Eurozone—which would have had a rippling effect 
on the world economy. Ultimately Greeks voted “no,” rejecting further austerity measures from 
the EU. Yet the problem was far from over, and despite the “no” vote, another austerity package 
was implemented just weeks later as a part of another financial-assistance program. Tsipras, who 
was reelected in September of 2015, is still in office, but political unrest continues. There is talk 
of early elections in May 2019, prompted by a voting public’s dislike of the Prime Minister 
(Amaro 2019). Over the course of the past four years, Tsipras’ had been accused of repeatedly 
folding to EU demands, which has made him widely unpopular. SYRIZA is likely to be replaced 
with the conservative New Democracy party come the next round of elections. 
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Riddled with political corruption, the great financial crisis of Europe hit Greece the 
hardest. The alternative to the Greek government’s capitulation in 2015 may have been forcing 
Greece out of the Eurozone and perhaps even the EU. Even though the latest memorandum 
ended in August 2018, the austerity measures remain, and Greece’s debt is far from being paid 
off. The current livelihood of Greeks is not so much a relic of a foregone crisis, but a new reality. 
In tandem with Greece’s economic meltdown, it has become a central hotspot of the European 
Refugee Crisis. While its geographic location provides a pathway to Europe from the Middle 
East and Central Asia, the EU has strategically mediated Greece as a main reception center, or 
“hotspot” of the crisis (Fassin 2016). Exemplary of the lack of burden-sharing in the modern 
refugee regime, economically insolvent countries such as Greece and Italy have become forced 
to bear the weight of European border control.  
Prosfiges  
	  
Lesvos, Greece 
July 10 2015  
The bus wound its way from the village of Plomari to the port in Mytilene, 
teetering on narrow roads between mountain and valley. When we finally made it 
to the ferry, I ran to the top deck, eager to feel the fresh morning air and salty 
wind off the sea. As we pulled away from shore toward Ayvalik, Turkey, another 
boat came in towards us in the distance. “Look,” someone said, maybe it was my 
mom. I gazed out over the water. There was a small boat, its crowded deck dotted 
with black and orange. It was towing a rubber dinghy behind it. The group 
gathered to the boat’s railing and watched with attention. That afternoon, 
returning back from our day trip, three of the same rubber boats were laid out on 
the concrete wharf. The group stood over them, looking inside at life jackets, 
inflatable floats, a single sock. Someone said something in Greek. “No photos, 
please.”  
 
The Greek word for refugees (prosfiges) was first used in the vernacular with particular 
significance in the 1920s (Green 2018). As a result of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, Greece 
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and Turkey agreed to what is known as the Population Exchange, uprooting nearly two million 
people in the removal Orthodox Christians from Turkey and Muslims from Greece. Though 
Turkish speakers who had lived all their lives in Asia Minor, nearly 1.5 million Orthodox 
Christians were classified as Greek and forcibly relocated and “returned.” At the same time, half 
a million Greek-speaking Muslims were deemed Turks and sent to Turkey (Shields 2013). As 
articulated by Sarah Green, this was the first time in modern Greek history that questions arose 
surrounding an influx of newcomers in a uniquely new social context (Green 2018). Through the 
rest of the twentieth century, various migrations in and from Greece continued, particularly 
surrounding the Greek Civil War in the 1940s (see Danforth and van Boeschoten 2011). Up until 
the 1990s, and even through the military junta (1967-74), government policy and legal guidelines 
were inconsistently concerned with foreigners in Greece (Green 2018). It was not until the 
dissolution of the Soviet bloc and the political fragmentation in the Balkans in the 1990s that 
Greece began to implement major immigration laws (Cabot 2014, Green 2018). Migrants, 
primarily from Albania, became part of a large informal labor market and Greek immigration 
policy became predicated on reactive integration (Skleparis 2017).  
Into the 2000s and up until today, armed conflict in the Middle East has resulted in 
refugee and migrant flows into Greece. Specifically, a shift occurred after 9/11, when foreign 
involvement in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan become drivers of forced migration. 
Before this, migration to Europe was primarily from African countries via Italy and Spain (Cabot 
2016). While Mediterranean countries in general still serve as the transit points for migration into 
Europe, Greece became a prominent port of entry in the early 2000s.  
The international lens has primarily focused on the recent wave of refugees from Syria 
since 2015. Though the scale of this refugee crisis is unprecedented and warrants critical 
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response, asylum seekers, refugees, and migrants have been coming to Europe by means of 
Greece for almost the past two decades. Discussed by Heath Cabot (2014), the flaws in the 
framework of Greece’s asylum system, which have been exacerbated by the EU’s migration 
mismanagement, have existed well before the arrival of Syrian refugees. In addition to 
administrative failures, anti-immigration sentiments began to rise before the “peak” of 2015.  
Notably, the neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn (Xrisi Avgi,) won eighteen seats in Parliament 
in the 2012 elections. In August of the same year, the government launched Operation Xenios 
Zeus, somewhat ironically named after the ancient god of strangers and guests. The program was 
systematically geared at curbing irregular migration but was widely criticized for its abuse of 
police power, racial profiling, and long-term detention. Though SYRIZA pledged to end the 
program in 2015, it became clear that government’s response to migration could not keep up 
with rapid increase of migrants and asylum seekers, as the number of people arriving to Greek 
shores began to spike that spring (Speri 2015).  
In 2015, the number of concentrated arrivals on Greek island of Lesvos accounted for 
fifty-seven percent of the total refugees and migrants to arrive in Greece (UNHCR 2015). In the 
same year, the UNHCR (2015) reported that Lesvos was receiving approximately 3,300 people 
per day. Most of these arrivals were coming due to armed conflict in their home countries, with 
seventy-five percent of people coming from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Clayton & Holland 
2015). The Aegean Sea’s choppy waters and its dangerous smuggling routes have proven deadly; 
over ten thousand people have died in their attempt in traveling from Turkey to islands of 
Lesvos, Chios, Samos, Leros, and Kos since the beginning of 2015 (UNHCR 2019). Although 
they are on the geographic periphery of Greece—and Europe—these islands have become the 
forefront of the refugee crisis.  
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Along the mainland’s northeastern border, the Evros River provides an alternative route 
for those crossing into Greece from Turkey. Running for most of its two hundred kilometer 
breadth along the Evros river, there is small corridor in which the border veers west away from 
the river, leaving a land area around twelve and a half kilometers long (Skleparis 2017). Along 
this stretch, Greece began constructing a fence in order to prevent migrants from crossing in 
December 2012. With this pathway closed, people have since been diverted to crossing the Evros 
river directly, which like the Aegean, has proven a dangerous and deadly journey (Lee 2017).  
Back before it was elected, the SYRIZA party ran on a platform that pledged to remove 
the fence at Evros, expedite the asylum process, and strengthen migration policy in general 
(Katsiaficas 2015, Skleparis 2017). Yet many of these promises never came to fruition. While 
the then newly-elected government did close the Xenios Zeus operated detention centers, they 
instead opened “hospitality centers,” or more formally an Open Refugee Hospitality Center 
[Ανοιχτή Δοµή Φιλοξενίας Προσφύγων.] The first of these centers on the mainland, Eleonas, 
was opened in August 2015. A fifteen-minute metro ride away from the city center, Eleonas was 
set to host primarily Afghans and Iranians whose claims are processed more slowly than Syrians. 
Also during this period, a law was passed that stated all refugees were to be hosted at “hospitality 
centers,” and those whose claims had been denied must return to the countries of origin 
(Skleparis 2017). However, these “hospitality centers,” which are in fact refugee camps, are far 
from an effective solution.  
As 2015 progressed and the influx of migrants and refugees continued, those who arrived 
on the islands were eager to travel to the mainland of Greece, and then the rest of Europe. The 
hot July day when I visited Moria Refugee Camp with a group of anthologists, people were 
waiting within concentric circles of the camp, the fringes being the newest arrivals and the center 
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those whose claims were closest to being processed. Driving that summer along the coastal roads 
close to the capital of the island, Mytilene, I saw clusters of tents and make-shift shelters beyond 
the confines of the camp. I do not know the number of people that were in the camp the day I 
was there. Today, however, the camp is nearing nine thousand occupants, almost three times its 
capacity (Kingsley 2018). 
As 2015 progressed and more people arrived on Lesvos and other islands, the lack of 
space in the camps and on the islands resulted in the lack of adequate living conditions. While 
Syrians and vulnerable people were fast tracked to the mainland, the claims of others, 
particularly Afghans, were not expedited. While the camps on the islands grew, so too did 
makeshift accommodations on the Greek mainland set up by those who made it there. Often, 
these individuals had not been properly registered on the islands and lacked proper 
documentation in part due to the inconsistency of Eurodac finger printing.  Arriving in Athens, 
informal camps were set up at the port of Piraeus and the old airport, Elliniko. These makeshift 
settlements were unassisted by the government, reliant on third party organizations and aid 
workers to provide many needed services. After the construction of Eleftherios Venizelos in 
2001, Athens’ current airport, Elliniko was no longer used. That is, until the refugee crisis. At 
one point, nearly four thousand people inhabited an informal camp at Elliniko before the 
government began bringing people to official centers where they could apply for asylum in 2016 
(Frej and Marans 2016). Camps such as those at Elliniko and in Piraeus existed elsewhere, too. 
In Athens, some of the abandoned 2004 Olympic complexes became occupied. Outside of the 
capital city, there was a large camp the northern village of Idomeni near the Macedonian border. 
Additionally, “squats” in empty buildings of Athens’ anarchist neighborhood, Exarchia, began to 
emerge as living spaces for many migrants and refugees in Athens. In particular, the City Plaza 
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Hotel, which became abandoned and in disrepair in the wake of the economic crisis, is not only a 
place of lodging, but has become a community center and self-declared space for providing 
“hope and dignity to those fleeing war and poverty” (City Plaza).  
The EU-Turkey Statement   
	  
For many, what was an intended stopping point on their journey to Northern Europe has 
become an indefinite waiting zone. In March 2016, the EU-Turkey Statement went into effect, 
closing the Greek-Macedonian border and implementing a “containment policy” that prohibits 
people on the islands from traveling to the mainland. With limited ability to travel in or out of 
Greece, the number of people in these makeshift camps was exacerbated. As a result, the Greek 
government implemented two programs that catered to people who had arrived before March 20, 
2016 and those who arrived afterward.   
Funded by the European Commission and operated by the Greek Asylum Service and the 
European Asylum Support Office (EASO), the initiative was aimed at accelerating the 
applications of close to 57,000 people residing in temporary accommodation sites in Greece 
between January 1, 2015 and March 20, 2016 (Frej and Marans 2016). Implemented in June 
2016 and ending two months later in August, the program offered “third country nationals” the 
option to apply for asylum in Greece, for family reunification, or relocation to another EU 
member state (EASO). Additionally, the government began busing people en masse to 
government operated centers, clearing out makeshift camps like Elliniko and Idomeni. 
Application through the pre-registration procedure did not necessarily grant asylum; rather, it 
supplied a card stating that an asylum application was being processed. It allowed for people to 
stay in Greece for up to a year, pending a decision on their claim. Not unlike “pink cards” (see 
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Cabot 2014), holders of pre-registration cards could access public education and public 
healthcare. However, these pre-registration cards did not grant holders the right to work, and 
thus, economic independence and integration fell aside to a system of reliance on third party 
organizations and aid services. Additionally, the rights that were granted under pre-registration 
cards, like “pink cards,” are precariously ensured and often rely on the asylum seeker’s 
knowledge of their rights (Cabot 2014).  
For those arriving after March 20, 2016, the Greek government signed into law the Fast-
Track Border Procedure for the eastern Aegean islands of Lesvos, Chios, Samros, Leros, Rhodes, 
and Kos (Greek Council for Refugees). Within its parameters, individuals who were identified as 
vulnerable—for example, pregnant women, unaccompanied minors, or victims of torture—or 
those who qualified for family reunification would be expedited to the mainland or other EU 
countries (Oxfam 2019). The Fast-Track Procedure is characteristically complicated, having 
variant tiers of qualifications for who can be sent to Turkey and who remains on the island in 
detention. In 2017, for example, asylum seekers coming from countries with an average 
recognition rate of twenty-five percent of more were judged on an individual basis against 
admissibility factors that determine if Turkey was a “safe third country” (Amnesty International 
2017). This constituted primarily Syrian refugees, who received a “negative” decision against 
these factors and were therefore kept on the islands. Asylum seekers that had average recognition 
rates under twenty-five percent were not subject to these admissibility factors. This included 
people from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia whose claims were directly 
addressed on the island where they arrived (Ibid.).  
The intricate parameters of the EU-Turkey deal in tandem with the Fast-Track Procedure 
have had a double sided effect; while statistically the number of arrivals in Greece has dropped 
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dramatically since its implementation, the policy has aggravated protracted refugee situations on 
the islands with increasingly insufficient conditions. While people arriving before March 20, 
2016 were granted access to move freely within Greece upon obtaining an asylum seekers card, 
those arriving after March 20, 2016 on Greek islands, who are not deemed vulnerable, do not 
have ability to leave until their claims are assessed. Because of the slow and even stalled 
assessment process, the reception centers have become inhospitably overcrowded. In turn, NGOs 
and other humanitarian aid organizations have appealed directly to the Greek government and 
the EU to help several times since 2015. In October 2017, nineteen international and local groups 
wrote a letter to Prime Minister Tsipras, saying, “We urge you to put an end to the ongoing 
'containment policy' of trapping asylum seekers on the islands if they arrived after the entry into 
force of the EU-Turkey deal” (IRC 2017). The letter indicated that some people have been 
trapped on the islands for nineteen months and that camps on Lesvos and Samos intended for 
three thousand are hosting more than 8,300 (Ibid.). The following month the General 
Commission of Administrative Courts of Greece recommended that claims should become 
accelerated, but this response was not tangibly enforced (OCHA 2018).  
Over the course of the 2017, conditions in the camps continued to deteriorate. In 
particular, Moria Refugee Camp in Lesvos has become notorious for its overcrowding and poor 
conditions. Since 2015, multiple people have died in the camp; a woman and her grandchild in 
November 2016 died after an explosion in their tent, and three asylum seekers in January 2017 
died in their sleep trying to stay warm from winter’s heavy snowfall (Ibid.). The mental health of 
those in the camp is also under close watch. The International Rescue Committee (IRC) reported 
that from September 2018, thirty percent of people at its mental health support center have 
attempted suicide, and sixty percent reported have considered attempting suicide (IRC 2019, 
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Oxfam 2019). Additionally, few people in the camp feel safe. A recent study by Refugee Rights 
Europe, cited in a January 2019 Oxfam report, states that two in three migrants in the camp 
“never feel safe” (Ibid.). Also included in the Oxfam report were accounts from women who feel 
so unsafe at night, that they have resorted to wearing diapers while they sleep to avoid going out 
the bathroom in the dark (Ibid.). The squalid conditions at Moria are putting the health of asylum 
seekers at serious risk and third party organizations continue to urge the government to move 
people off the island and to the mainland. The Greek government has responded by ferrying 
people to the mainland, but NGOs, like Oxfam, argue that it is not enough to keep up with new 
arrivals to the islands (Oxfam 2019). Instead, they recommend that the Greek government 
remove the “containment policy” that restricts asylum seekers from moving to the mainland at 
their own accord. This would release some of the pressure of the overcrowding on the islands. In 
April 2018, Greece’s highest administrative court ruled that the “containment policy” held no 
legitimate legal basis and ordered the ban on travel from the islands to be lifted. However, just 
days later, the government reinstated the policy, and it is still in effect today.  
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Chapter 3: The “Figure of the Refugee”: Thinking with Agamben and Arendt 
 
July 2018 
Athens, Greece 
I liked to walk home from work, the bus was always late anyway. I would take my 
time, sometimes meandering into Exarchia or staying straight, walking past 
Omonia Square to Syntagma.  Months earlier, when I was at my study abroad 
orientation, the program had shown us a list of places in the city that were either 
in a “green” or “red” zone. “Green” meant go. Syntagma. “Red” meant don’t. 
Omonia. These zones were contrived by the program, and though students were 
not restricted from these places during the semester, we were warned about 
traveling to these parts of the city. Inexplicitly, the colors cautioned venturing into 
the predominately immigrant neighborhoods of the city and emphasized spending 
time in the more touristy, more stereotypically “Greek” parts of Athens. Most 
students I knew followed this protocol, staying in and around the quaint 
neighborhood of Pangrati, only seeing Omonia if they had to pass through it on a 
visit to the National Archaeological Museum. During the summer, my walks home 
from work were from the “red” zone to the “green” zone. On these walks, I liked 
to notice the changes in the cityscape, reflecting on the contrived divisions of 
space; colors, lines, names. I thought about the gradient of red to green. In the 
transitions of faces and buildings around me, what served as the boundary 
between “go” and “don’t”? These zones, whatever color, became blurred in the 
July heat, as I would sometimes stop for a freddo espresso, or wander off to 
explore another neighborhood. To me, the city was shaping itself by a leisurely 
walk, its boundaries chromatically indistinct.  
 
In his essay Beyond Human Rights, Giorgio Agamben writes, “the refugee should be 
considered for what it is, namely, nothing less than a limit-concept that at once brings a radical 
crisis to the principles of the nation-state and clears the way for a renewal of categories that can 
no longer be delayed” (2010: 23). Within the current refugee crisis along Agamben’s arguments, 
the category of the refugee as a subversion to the nation-state system can be contextualized. In 
particular, a discussion beginning with the anthropological scholarship pertaining to 
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classifications and liminality (van Gennep 1960, Douglas 1966, Turner 1967) will help set the 
groundwork for a theoretical turn towards Agamben.  
The concept of liminality, Agamben’s “limit-concept,” precedes a discussion of the 
category of the refugee. Originally outlined by Arnold van Gennep (1960), his foundational 
theory argues that rites are composed of three phases: separation, margin, and aggregation. 
Building on van Gennep, Viktor Turner suggests that “transitional beings are particularly 
polluting, since they are neither one thing nor another; or may be both; or neither here nor there; 
or may even be nowhere” (Turner 1967:97). This liminal phase produces a marginalization 
which can be discussed in terms of the category of the refugee. In between states of citizenship, 
the refugee occupies a distinct set of classifications as a result of the Westphalian nation-state 
system. This contemporary system has generated the ways in which identity is mediated between 
person and place. The members of states within this system are subject to its power in not only 
their production and reproduction of the system itself, but in their relationship with the way the 
state orders knowledge. The exertion of state power in terms of ideologies (Althusser 1971) has 
become so potent that it becomes disguised in its existence. In other words, the order of things is 
reconsecrated in the reciprocal relationship between state and subject. Particularly, this 
relationship is predicated on economic conditions, which substantiate ideologies within a 
particular economic context. For Althusser, a neo-Marxist, the sustaining of the state is deeply 
dependent on its economic milieu. Althusser argues that these justifications are inherently subtle; 
it is imbued in education and in the media which standardize social practices (Althusser 1971; 
see Allison 1991). This experience thus confines the subject within a set of expectations, 
(re)shaping identities and both the level of both the individual and the polity.  
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While spatially bounded by the extent of certain state apparatuses, identity is not only 
characterized by ideologies like nationalism, but also, “the large cultural systems that preceded 
it, out of which—as well as against which—it came into being” (Anderson 1991:19; cited by 
Malkki 1995a: 5). In particular, Liisa Malkki also suggests that the social life produced within 
the nation-state system should be discussed in terms of the “national order of things” (1995a: 5). 
This ordering works to classify and categorize at variant dimensions; the categorization that 
occurs on the global level of nation-states trickles down to the daily lives of its subjects, who in 
turn, reconfirm it. Moreover, it is not without consideration that the economic environment of the 
nation-state system serves as a factor of influence in the production of the system and its 
ideologies. Many of the countries from which refugees are coming around the world were 
colonized by dominating states in the Westphalian system. This “national order of things” stems 
from a hegemony that was rooted in colonizing practices, motivated by pecuniary gain.  To 
expand on the point that Malkki makes, the subversion of the “national order of things” is 
highlighted by the category of the refugee (1995a:6). This is because the refugee not only 
undermines the relationship of subject and state, under which the subject is a protected citizen, 
but also because statehood itself is rooted in a system that cannot be disconnected from its 
colonial past. Moreover, looking at Turner’s ideas of liminality, the refugee occupies the 
marginal space between statehood, excluded from categories of citizenship and thus included 
within the category which has been essentialized as the “refugee.” This category, according to 
Agamben, which should markedly evocate human rights discourse more than any other figure, 
instead is a “disquieting element in the order of the nation-state…by breaking the identity 
between the human and the citizen and that between nativity and nationality, it brings the 
originary fiction of sovereignty to crisis” (Agamben 2000).  
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 Turner’s concept of the liminal draws from Mary Douglas (1966) who discusses “matter 
out of place” as a challenge to the systematic order of things. Douglas argues that “danger lies in 
transitional states, simply because transition is neither one state nor the next, it is undefinable” 
(97). The danger, in the case of Malkki’s “national order of things,” is to defy the system’s 
categorization mechanisms which are otherwise seen as legitimate. In Origins of Totalitarianism 
(1951:286), Hannah Arendt generated a discussion of the “stateless” person as a stubborn threat 
to the nation-state system. She writes:  
“Much worse than what statelessness did to the time-honored and necessary 
distinctions between nationals and foreigners, and to the sovereign right of states 
in matters of nationality and expulsion, was the damage suffered by the very 
structure of legal national institution when a growing number of residents had to 
live outside the jurisdiction of these laws and without being protected by any 
other.”  
 
Though writing about the aftermath of the World Wars, Arendt’s discussion has fostered more 
contemporary scholarship on the subject on statehood and subjectivity. The stateless person, 
paralleled with the refugee, lacks a sort of political visibility. This follows Turner’s model of 
liminality in that “the structural ‘invisibility’ of liminal personae has a twofold character. They 
are at once no longer classified and not yet classified” (Turner 1967:95-6). As cited in Malkki 
(1995a: 7), this passage illustrates that the refugee is included through their exclusion, gaining a 
sort of markedness within certain arenas (i.e. humanitarian aid organizations where refugees 
become a center of focus) while becoming invisible in others (i.e. the realm of political 
protection as citizens). The marginalization of persons between statehoods therefore constructs a 
new category into which they are included nonetheless.  
 Recalling the 2011 UNHCR Handbook, the category of the refugee is one which the 
nation-state and international refugee regime distinguish within a set of their own parameters. 
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“Recognition of his refugee status does not therefore make him a refugee but declares him to be 
one. He does not become a refugee because of recognition, but is recognized because he is a 
refugee” (Ch 1. Paragraph 28). This passage articulates that when one comes into the liminal 
space between statehoods, a type of definitive action, only then can one become entangled within 
a recognized category. Beyond the definition of the “refugee” provided by the 1951 Convention, 
a product of historically determined policy, the recognition of the “refugee” happens within the 
space of social discourse. The “refugee” as “matter out of place” (Douglass 1966) is thus 
fundamentally outside the realm of order. Extrapolating this to the context of normalcy, the 
“refugee” is read as a universalized anomaly (Malkki 1995a: 8). Essentializing the “refugee” 
posits persons between statehoods as victims in need of saving. Yet, the fact that refugees are 
outside the order of normalcy remains evident; the ideology of such is internalized but the 
subjects of the state and thus the “refugee” is seen again as two fold. The innocent and uprooted 
victim, who should by nature evocate human rights discourse (Agamben 2000), is juxtaposed by 
its position as a threat to societal order.  
 The “refugee” is also seen, following Malkki’s discussion, as someone “uprooted” from 
not only a space, but from a culture. This uprooting translates to a sense of loss of one’s place 
among order, identity, and the relationship between the two. This uprootedness and sense of loss 
can be put into discussion with the concepts of biopower (also biopolitics) (Foucault 1990, 2003) 
and bare life (Agamben 1998). Foucault describes biopower as a form of power concerned with 
the regulation of life into the affairs of the state. In other words, “biopower thus refers to a 
situation which what is directly at stake in power is the production and reproduction of life itself” 
(Hardt & Negri 2000:24). Thus, the individual control over one’s body becomes subject to the 
domain of the state. Foucault regards this as the “threshold of modernity,” insofar as society has 
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reached this threshold “when the life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies” 
(Foucault 1990: 143). Wherein pre-modern states, the sovereign possessed more deductive 
power, operating on the administration of death, the modern era is characterized by shift toward 
the axis of life and the emergence of biopolitics. Agamben draws on Foucault’s analysis of 
biopower and departs from it in arguing that it is not characteristic of the modern era; and rather, 
“biopolitics is at least as old as the sovereign exception” (Agamben 1998:6). To “correct or, at 
least, complete” the Foucauldian thesis on biopolitics, Agamben (1998:9) writes:  
 In a sense that what characterizes modern politics is not so much the inclusion of 
the zoe in the polis—which is, in itself, absolutely ancient—nor simply the fact 
that life as such becomes a principle object of the projections and calculations of 
State power. Instead the decisive fact is that, together with the process by which 
the exception everywhere becomes the rule, the realm of bare life—which is 
originally situated at the margins of the political order—gradually begins to 
coincide with the political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, 
bios and zoe, right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction. 
 
 The passage highlights the key components of Agamben’s claim on the power of the 
contemporary state. This ‘sovereign exception’ refers to anti-liberal German philosopher Carl 
Schmitt’s theory outlined in The Concept of the Political (2007) and Political Theology: Four 
Chapter on the Concept of Sovereignty (1985) concerning the state of exception. Schmitt argues 
that the sovereign’s power to suspend the law in the interest of the state transcends it. The state 
has the power to define the normal status of legal order, and in its decision to suspend the normal 
order, it therefore creates its basis; the normal is defined by the exception, which is decided by 
the state. This concept follows from Thomas Hobbes, who argued that in the state of nature, 
subjects were obedient to the sovereign in exchange for their protection (cited by Owens 2009: 
570). Yet, even then, the sovereign could kill its subjects, and the potential for chaos, or tanquam 
dissolute, would emerge anytime from the normal order. It was thus at the decision, and the 
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power, of the sovereign to protect its subjects, to maintain order, or to suspend it. For Agamben 
(2003:23), this state of exception is an “integral part of positive law because the necessity that 
grounds it is an autonomous source of law” as well as “essentially extrajuridical,” meaning it 
extends beyond the law in order to restore it. Inherently for Agamben, “the state of exception is 
not a special kind of law (like the law of war); rather, in so far as it is a suspension of the 
juridical order itself, it defines law’s threshold or limit concept” (2003:4). Looking back to 
Walter Benjamin and his argument that “the tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the “state 
of emergency” in which we live is not the exception but the rule” (2003:392), Agamben asserts 
that the state of exception is indeed the new normal.  
“A Disquieting Element” 
	  
To discuss the state of exception which has paradoxically become the rule, Agamben 
draws on the model of the concentration camp, a metonym of the modern state, produced from a 
“zone of irreducible indistinction.” To argue this, he expands on Arendt’s distinction between the 
zoe and the bios (Arendt 1958; Agamben 1998). Agamben, following Arendt, borrows the 
Aristotelian concepts of bios and zoe (Agamben 1998). These terms are adopted from the ancient 
Greek words zoe, life shared by all beings, and bios, the political life of humans. Thus, life was 
recognized in two ways: defined by one’s social existence in community, and by one’s living 
existence with biological needs, devoid of political function. Wherein ancient Greece these 
notions were entirely separate, relegated into private and public spheres, Agamben argues that in 
the contemporary West these concepts have collapsed. In other words, the government’s 
protection of life and its processes have made it central to its politics, blurring the distinction 
between the zoe and the bios. Articulated by Arendt: “we see the body of peoples and political 
communities in the image of a family whose everyday affairs have to be taken care of by a 
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gigantic, nation-wide administration of housekeeping” (Arendt 1958: 28). While this inclusion of 
life into politics was at first intended in order to protect it, the result is a focus so much on 
biological life that it strips it of its human qualities. Thus, life becomes bare and easily regulated, 
becoming unprotected through its intended protection. Agamben’s archetypal example for this is 
the homo sacer, a Roman figure whose life could be killed but not sacrificed (Agamben 1998: 
83). This expelled the homo sacer from life defined by political existence, bios, and reduced his 
life to that of zoe, or biological existence. The homo sacer is banned from society and can be 
killed without consequence; yet, it cannot be sacrificed, or in other words, meaning cannot be 
prescribed to the death of the homo sacer.  This does not so much exemplify the existence of zoe, 
but the forced reduction of one from bios to zoe. It is this reduction, and this exclusion from the 
political and legal sphere of life, that thereby includes the homo sacer within the system of the 
state. Further, he writes (Agamben 1998: 87): 
The same bare life that in the ancien regime was politically neutral and belonged 
to God as creaturely life and in the classical word was (at least apparently) clearly 
distinguished as zoe from political life (bios) now fully enters into the structure of 
the state and even becomes the earthly foundation of the state’s legitimacy and 
sovereignty  
    
In terms of a discussion of refugee studies, refugees exemplify the existence of bare life in that 
their state-less status has excluded them from the realm of the bios and protection of the state. 
This exclusion from the law thereby includes them. Further, the “discursive and institutional 
domains” produce a “figure of the refugee” that work within the framework of the “national 
order of things” (Malkki 1995b: 498). This order of things works not only at the level of the 
sovereign, but in the everyday practices which sustain its power. Looking back to Althusser’s 
(1966) notions of the ideological state apparatus, the disciplinary power of the state is no longer 
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rooted solely in repressive police force, but (re)generated by the internalization of ideologies 
which justify state power. Foucault emphasizes this point as well when he says: “the old power 
of death that symbolized sovereign power was now carefully supplanted by the administration of 
bodies and the calculated management of life” (Foucault 1987: 139-40). Whereas Foucault is less 
concerned with the economic foreground of ideologies than Althusser, both are concerned with 
the power of the state as a productive force, instead of a repressive one (Owens 2009: 570).  
Therefore, insofar that the power of the state is productive, it can be argued that the 
refugee is an identifiable category produced by the nation-state system. The power of the state to 
construct this category lies not only within the direct sovereign’s malleability of the law, but 
within the social (re)production of particular ideologies. While citizens are ensured protection by 
their sovereign, an analogous framework exists for protecting refugee in the International 
Refugee Regime. The consequences of the 1951 Convention and the UNHCR are protracted 
situations in which refugees are left in indefinite limbo, without access to one of the three 
durable solutions. While the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations provide aid to 
refugees and migrants, acting as a type of sovereign themselves, they still function within the 
broader nation-state system. Thus, though “protected” by humanitarian organizations, the 
“refugee” is nonetheless exposed not only as a marginal figure in a liminal zone curated by the 
sovereign, but by traditional humanitarian frameworks whose primary goal of service relies on a 
precarious liminality.  
 Agamben articulates this as a “zone of indistinction,” which becomes operative when the 
state of exception is enforced, and which paradoxically, perpetually exists. It is not so much the 
suspension of law by the state that determines the state of exception, but the state’s potential to 
suspend the rule of law at any time. When refugees are excluded from the state in terms of 
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citizenship and certain rights, they are re-included in the political sphere in a way which 
undermines its integrity. The relationship between ‘man and citizen’ has been a central 
component of the nation-state system, predicating the protection of rights within this dualism. 
However, the category of the refugee highlights these ‘sacred and inalienable’ rights of man 
“only to the degree which he is… the citizen” (Agamben 1995: 4; see Ramadan 2012: 68). 
Though not citizens of the state, refugees are individuals that are in need of protection 
nonetheless, invoking discourse of human rights. While not analogous to the homo sacer, the 
category of the refugee is for an instant a reminder of the homo sacer, a figure entirely 
disposable and outcast from the state. The marginal figure of the refugee is both included by the 
sovereign, and by the nation-state system in its recognition and construction of this category, but 
is also excluded from the realm of citizenship. Thus, for Agamben, the figure of the refugee is a 
“disquieting element in the order of the nation-state…by breaking the identity between the 
human and the citizen and that between nativity and nationality, it brings the originary fiction of 
sovereignty to crisis” (Agamben 2000). 
The suspension of the rule of law which was once exercised in the capacity of martial law 
is now “increasingly to appear as the dominant paradigm of government in contemporary 
politics” (Agamben 2005:2). For Agamben, this ‘dominant paradigm’ is manifest in the model of 
the camp. While a philosophical motif, the camp as a spatial arraignment can be physically 
exemplified. Notably, Agamben and Arendt, uses concentration camps in Nazi Germany as the 
primary example of a zone of indistinction where bare life has materialized. Within 
concentration camps, the state suspended the rule of law and reduced its citizens to bare life. 
Subsequently, the ability to kill those within the camp without consequence demonstrate a form 
of violence that, for Agamben, is increasing in contemporary society. He writes, “today it is not 
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the city but rather the camp that is the fundamental biopolitical paradigm for the West” 
(Agamben 1998:181).  
The camp and the zone of indistinction have philosophical frameworks that can be 
grounded in the tangible reality of refugee crises. The ambiguous space of disorder, dangerous 
and marginal, has paradoxically become the rule. This mode of crisis is not so much about 
returning order, but rather, reshaping and readapting to new normals. Crisis, in this sense, 
extends beyond the “moments of truth” (2012 1971, Redfield 2005) and, instead of seeking an 
old equilibrium, contours new narratives (Redfield 2005, Cabot 2014). These narratives are often 
dictated by the media, whose can construct a particular perspective to a crisis (Redfield 2005: 
336). Yet, even international media coverage of crisis relies on an audience’s willingness to 
react. The narratives of crisis, in one form expressed through the currents of media, traverse the 
fabric of every day lives, navigating the ebbing marginalization that is dictated by certain 
internalized ideologies. This is particularly important when considering the case of Greece’s 
overlap of economic and refugee crises. Not only because the “refugee” is for Agamben a 
reminder of bare life, but also because the ideologies by which crisis is internalized, and further 
responded to, are contextualized within an economic depression.   
Addressing Agamben’s camp motif in comparison to contemporary refugee camps, 
certain parallels between theory and practice can be drawn. While the intention of concentration 
camps was genocide, exemplifying the state’s power over death, a properly functioning refugee 
camp is intended to sustain life (Redfield 2005). Nonetheless, the mechanisms on which the state 
operates to ensure either life or death are eerily similar. Life, its survival or its loss, is the praxis 
of control within the camp. Though many refugees around the world live within cities, outside of 
traditional camps, spatial arrangements that exclude refugees from the economic and social 
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systems of the state work in a paradigmatically similar way to the camp. In the case of the 
refugee crisis in Greece, the discussion of refugee camps, such as Moria, are situated within 
Agamben’s arguments. As asylum seekers are denied the ability to move off of the island, 
trapped within deteriorating conditions, the application of Agamben’s argument is articulated by 
Redfield (2005): “life is exposed beneath the language of rights invoked to defend it and the 
protest against conditions that produced the camp in the first place” (342). Moria, though a camp 
grounded in sustaining life, is not held responsible before the law if life has been taken away. 
The deaths of asylum seekers at Moria highlight this; the government is not held accountable as 
the perpetrator. Further, the lives of asylum seekers have become reliant on a system where third 
party actors such humanitarian organizations or the UNHCR are responsible for fundaments of 
life. This was similarly seen in cases of makeshift campus in Piraeus and at Ellinko. These sites 
operated without government regulation, dependent on humanitarian agencies to help provide 
services. Yet, while it appeared as if the Greek government was removed from these camps, not 
offering regulation at the time of their function, they were able to clear them out in summer 
2016. Ultimately, the sovereign holds the overarching ability to regulate law and life; the crisis is 
not so much an outside force affecting the state, but an internal expression of state power in its 
response.  
Many third party agencies, such as the UNHCR, humanitarian groups, or other NGOs, 
have declared themselves apolitical. Yet, they often assume the same role that sovereign would 
within the camp. The apparent neutrality of these organizations questions the role of 
responsibility in humanitarianism when it comes to preserving life within the camp. While those 
that provide aid are intended to be temporarily operational, their response is predicated on the 
existence of the camp, something that itself has become a paradoxical rule of the state of 
	  
54 
	  
exception. Further, these humanitarian organizations are defending life in a way that “both 
recognizes and refuses politics” (Redfield 2005: 343). Because the entire existence of the camp 
is predicated on the nation-state model, the UNHCR and third party organizations work within 
its frameworks to reciprocally reconstruct not only the category of the refugee, but also 
reconstitute states of exception. Observed by Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson (2002), 
humanitarian organizations perform state-like functions themselves by creating their own type of 
sovereignty within the larger system (Redfield 2005). Though this is the case, the sovereignty of 
the state and the sovereignty-like power created by third-party organizations are not entirely 
analogous. The difference lies within the effect each has on physical, social, and political agency.  
Contextualizing Crisis  
	  
 The Greek economic crisis has elicited particular response to the refugee crisis. This 
response is not so much a direct correlation with the refugee crisis; rather, the economic collapse 
was an impetus for a certain context into which an unprecedented amount of refugees and 
migrants came to Greek shores. Reflecting on the concept of power and its role in the 
state/subject relationship, the collapse of the Greek economy affected power within state and 
social praxes. This affected the way in which the Greece, in terms of both the state and its 
citizens, responded to asylum seekers, migrants, and refugees even before the 2015 “peak.” In 
2012, Xenios Zeus Operation was in effect, targeting individuals in order to remove them from 
certain spaces and detain them in others. The objective, as articulated by the police, was to make 
Athens a “lawful” city (Kallianos 2018: 48). This rhetoric is reminiscent of the state’s ability to 
exercise legal control beyond the scope of normal order in the name of public good; to invoke a 
state of exception. This public or common good allows for the state to (re)configure particular 
aspects of its authority over it subjects, as well as groups that it may recast to bare life. This 
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discursive framework justifies state interventions (Kallianos 2018: 49), and in turn produces 
certain ideological expectations. This is to say, the state is seeking to normalize disorder in the 
name of public good, avoiding and escaping times of crisis.  
 Crisis, not only an external disruption to the normal order, can appear as internal 
modality by which the state’s power is tested. While the sovereign can decide a state of 
exception as means of exerting its power, crisis can also evoke a need for government 
legitimization. The legitimacy of the Greek state has been tested by the economic crisis: the 
welfare system is faltering, there is a rise in homelessness, an increase in suicide rates. This 
“legitimacy” refers to the state’s obligation to protect the life of its citizens, the fundamental 
biopolitical framework that defines the modern state. It also questions the measures which the 
state takes to ensure this contract; argued by Habermas (1976: 48) and cited by Kallianos 
(2018:46): “Legitimation crises result from a need for legitimation that arises from changes in 
the political system… and that cannot be met by existing supply of legitimation.” In the case of 
Greece, the state’s mentality is focused on overcoming the crises in the name of the public good. 
This, ideally, would manifest in ways such as the stabilization of the economy, the reduction of 
the country’s debt, a decrease in unemployment rates, an end to the protracted refugee situations 
on the islands. Yet, the economic underpinnings of the ideological apparatus posit a certain 
paradox; while the government’s response to the crises renders it in need of legitimization, the 
crises in of itself works to legitimize the government. According the Agamben (2013), “today 
crisis has become an instrument of rule. It serves to legitimize political and economic decisions 
that in fact disposes citizens and deprive them of any possibility of decision.” The government 
acting in the name of the public good legitimizes itself; it has the power to suspend the normal 
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legal order which is in itself a crisis, in the name of ending the crisis. This both calls into 
question and reaffirms the state’s power.  
 Within the parameters of the capitalist nation-state system, the way in which the state 
remains stable is sustained through continuous and successful economic practices, motivated by 
particular ideologies. When this is disrupted, so too is the nation-state system. As articulated by 
Athena Athanasiou (2018), economic crises highlight the conceptualizations of the “liberal-
capitalist spirt of the ‘good life’ and the neoliberal management of crisis” (20). This ‘good life’ 
offers a vitality predicated on economic stability, which is inherently related the stability of the 
state. When it falters, considering the state’s biopolitical control, the regulation of vitality 
extends beyond economic life, but to life itself. The livability of subjects becomes an interplay 
between labor and life, agency and vulnerability. The government’s neoliberal management of 
crisis results in strict austerity measures and the diminishing social programs, and thus cannot 
protect economic vitality or general livelihood. Heath Cabot sheds light to the effects of this in 
Greece today, as “citizens themselves are increasingly facing the radical precaritization of rights, 
belonging, and life—a struggle that has often been ascribed to the domain of alienage” (Cabot 
2018: 6). From the trends towards neoliberalization, a “precarity continuum” has emerged on 
which both the subjectivity of citizens and refugees are resituated (Cabot 2018: 7). This 
reconfigures discourse concerning the relationship between subjectivity and individual agency.  
◆ 
Considering the neoliberal management of crisis in Greece not only presents questions about the 
vulnerability, precarity, and subjectivity, but also makes room for a discussion about agency and 
agonism in the public sphere. The divide between the public and the private, the social and the 
political, the included and the excluded, becomes blurred as the agenda for public debate is no 
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longer set by easily marked boundaries. In the wake of severe austerity measures and a reduction 
of social welfare programs, debate and demonstration can be analyzed in the public sphere 
through the lenses of anthropological and critical theory. By assessing the normative frameworks 
that arose from neoliberal crisis management, space that is open for excluded bodies to break 
through into the public is found amongst existing and permissible channels of communication.  
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Chapter 4: Considering Agency, Communication, and Solidarity in the Public 
Sphere 
	  
Summer, 2017:  a group of thirty-five migrants, primarily from Africa, were arrested after 
they staged a protest inside the Moria refugee camp on the island of Lesvos. The charges 
included the use or threat of violence against publics officials, dangerous bodily harm, arson with 
intent to endanger life, and property damage (Legal Centre Lesvos). Following the event, videos 
surfaced on social media showing state police entering the “African section” of Moria, shooting 
tear gas and beating people, including a pregnant woman (Musaferat 2017). News of the ordeal 
incited reaction not only in Greece, but drew attention from around the world. The individuals 
arrested acquired the nickname the “Moria 35,” and “Free the Moria 35” became a slogan for 
advocates on their behalf. In a statement, the European Council on Refugees and Exiles wrote, 
“We believe this prosecution is part of an ongoing policy to criminalize and silence those who 
question their hostile containment” (Orjuela & Leete 2018). 
The Legal Centre Lesvos, a group of international volunteers providing legal assistance 
to asylum-seekers and migrants, reported that as a result of a trial in April 2018, thirty-two of the 
thirty-five were found guilty of one offense and given a short sentence. In October, 2018, a year 
and three months after the July protest, the last of the Moria 35 arrested was released. While 
eventually charges were dropped, and those convicted finished serving jail time, the legal 
advocacy group reported that there were “flagrant breaches of the defendants’ basic rights to a 
fair trial during the whole process, including the lack of translation and the unjustified and 
prolonged pre-trial detention” (Legal Centre Lesvos).  
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The long-drawn-out case of the Moria 35 exemplifies the way in which reaction to 
migration in Greece plays out at both the public and the political level. Solidarity campaigns and 
support for those convicted spotlighted the arrests of the Moria 35, as well as the conditions on 
the hotspot islands, and the state’s criminalization of migrants. On the other hand, Far Right 
groups have responded to migrants in Greece with violence. Around the time of the Moria 35 
hearings in April 2018, clashes broke out between nearly two hundred Far Right protestors and a 
group of asylum seekers and migrants in Mytilene’s main square (Strickland 2018b). Moreover, 
racially motivated hate-crimes on the whole in Greece have escalated. The latest 2017 report 
shows that hate crimes motivated by race, national origin, or skin color nearly tripled since 2016 
(Strickland 2018a). Not only on the streets, but in the courts as well, there is a demonstration of 
intolerance toward migrants in Greece. 
Illustrated by a series of court cases taking place at the end of February 2019 and into 
March, the criminalization of forms of protests is an example of the continued attempt to exclude 
refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants from public discourse. The Legal Centre Lesvos reports 
that these trials address a range of protests, from peaceful occupation of Lesvos’ central Sapphos 
Square in November 2017, to the demonstration that escalated to a violent attack by Right-wing 
nationalists in late April 2018 (Legal Centre Lesvos 2019). The arrests of individuals involved 
highlight the procedures in place that regulate participation in the public sphere. Taking to the 
streets and demonstrating is a physical way of exercising agency, of breaking through into the 
public. Yet, in a public that is contextualized in Greece’s overlapping crises, the room for 
discourse and agency is contoured by a normative framework of neoliberal crisis management.  
In A Brief History of Neoliberalism, David Harvey outlines the trademark of 
neoliberalism as the “deregulation, privatization, and withdrawal of the state from many areas of 
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social provision” (Harvey 2005:23). Harvey also acknowledges that the trends away from liberal 
economic policies toward newer neoliberal ones reconfigure the role of the individual as an 
agent. As the praxis of state and economic environments shift, so too must the ideologies that 
support them. Thus, the action and material, the agent and the product, must also shift along 
these lines (Gershon 2011: 538). The behaviors that bolster a neoliberal system are articulated by 
Foucault, who writes, “In this view, like the market, competition, too, is not a natural fact always 
already part of parcel of the economic domain. Instead, this fundamental economic mechanism 
can function only if support is forthcoming to bolster a series of conditions, and adherence to the 
latter must consistently be guaranteed by legal measures” (Lemke 2001: 193). This is to say, the 
competitive nature incentivized by neoliberalism, a fundamental mechanism of the system, is 
conditioned by the enforcement of a particular legality. In turn, these legal measures are 
implemented and sustained by internalized ideologies of those it affects. The system works 
because those within it continually propagate it. For Foucault, “the only appropriate social 
policies supporting the entrepreneurial form of rationality could ensure that the right form of 
capitalism would dominate” (Lemke 2001:195, cited in Gershon 2011:538). While this manifests 
itself in political policy, it bears social implications on the role of the individual. Holding 
individuals to certain agentive expectations, neoliberal policies lead to questioning the space 
between expectation and ability.  
While a liberal stance emphasizes a right to one’s property in correlation to the capacity 
for labor, a more neoliberal vantage posits that one’s skills ought to be nurtured and developed 
beyond a singular capacity (Martin 200; see Gershon 2011). This turn towards an investment in 
one’s skills extrapolates expectations for one’s agency. Neoliberal ideologies focus not only on 
ability to work, but the continual improvement of one’s labor, further inciting a sense of self 
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which requires “participants to be reflexive managers of their abilities and alliances” (Gershon 
2011: 539). Individuals are not seen so much for their capacity to generate products. Instead, it is 
the skills of their production that have become marketable. This fosters a kind of social 
relationship between employer and employee, government and subject, because it promotes a 
new sense of obligation towards continuously improving procedure. One’s agentive ability is 
now something to be invested in, not only to be utilized in the here and now. Summarized by 
Ilana Gershon (2001: 542-43),  
A neoliberal perspective assumes that the actors who create and are created by the 
most ideal social order are those who reflexively and flexibly manage themselves 
as one owns and manages a business, tending to one’s own qualities and traits as 
owned and even improvable assets… a neoliberal perspective of agency depends 
on transforming liberalism’s possessive individualism (Macpherson 1962) into 
corporate individualism, viewing all agents as commensurate corporate entities so 
that social organization or differences in scale can be ignored. 
 
Moreover, agency is also something that is culturally mediated (Hernandez and Iyengar 2001). In 
other words, how and why individuals act can be characterized by particular ideological 
influences. Agency from an ideologically Western perspective emphasizes motivation and the 
establishment of a distinctiveness in action. This Western, personal agency is set apart from 
understandings of collective agency. Elucidated by Elizabeth Povinelli (2009: 98) “bodies and 
values are stakes in individual games of chance and that any collective agency (other than the 
corporation) is an impediment to the production of value” (cited in Besteman 2016: 199). In the 
broader context of neoliberalism, the relationship between the individual and the collective is 
connected to the enhancement or reduction of equality (Heron 2008).  
Because a neoliberal state is predisposed to favor policies that promote its own capitalist 
gain, access to agency is not always equitable. Neoliberal politics promote privatization and 
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restricted social welfare programs. In the case of crisis, this sort of management does not 
facilitate individual agency for those whose livelihoods would otherwise be dependent on state 
welfare programs. Instead, neoliberal policies incentivize agency for those who start with 
economic advantage and diminish it for those who are already encumbered. The policies that 
stress economic growth are prioritized by the state while social development programs fall aside. 
As a result, the economic class becomes more pronounced and the tensions that arise “reduce 
human beings to living a life of insecurity and tension, resorting to survivalist strategies… in 
such instances, the neoliberal policy environment saps human agency” (Heron 2008: 10). If this 
is the case, what avenues remain for individuals who are resorting to these so called “survivalist 
strategies” to express agency? While political and economic agency may be diminished, is 
agency entirely lost? Furthermore, in the case of refugees, who are “living a life of insecurity and 
tension”, how is agency expressed? The interplay between neoliberal policy and the state’s 
biopolitical control poses interesting questions around agentive ability. In particular application 
to the refugee crisis in Greece, the means by which agency is expressed in a system of neoliberal 
crisis management can be discussed in terms of the public sphere.  
Neoliberal Norms   
	  
The reconfiguration of subjectivity in the neoliberal management of crisis can be 
analyzed through the Foucauldian lens of biopolitics. The trajectory of Foucault’s discussions of 
governmentality and the state’s regulation of bodily function emerge in the modern context of 
crisis normalization. In crises, the government’s self-legitimization through protecting the public 
good finds roots in capitalist frameworks that favor upward mobility. The well-being of those 
who benefit from neoliberal governmentality comes at the expense of vulnerable bodies below. 
The dispensing of these bodies manifests itself through destructive modes of power and is 
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oriented toward ensuring the public good. Yet in this framework the public good includes a 
particular public whose vitality has become economized. The capitalism that prevails in the 
modern market-system also pervades in the construction of social norms and values. In other 
words, the economic precedent set by the neoliberal system in turn imbues the social and 
political dialogue with an amenability towards ones’ productivity. The vitality of individuals as a 
concern of the state becomes economized as it is relegated into the public social and political 
sphere. The result is an uneven distribution of resources primarily between the normative groups 
that the system favors and the racialized and gendered bodies of those which it abjects 
(Athanasiou 2018, 21). Moreover, neoliberalism is not only an economic system, but a type of 
governmentality whose power is exercised through biopolitical management and competitive 
individualization, reconfiguring the relationship between the state and the citizen, the public and 
the private (Athanasiou 2018, 21).  
In crisis, neoliberalism’s production of morality that favors self incentivized mobility and 
the potential of productive labor falsely protects more vulnerable persons.  Further, as articulated 
by Athena Athanasiou, the neoliberal state uses crises as a means to legitimize itself (2018: 16). 
In the case of Greece, the government’s claim to secure the common or public good from 
external crises becomes apparent in the state’s ability to contour new normals. Simply put, 
“Crisis necessitates the realism of constant management- both preemptive and reparative” 
(Athanasiou 2018: 16). Athanasiou also looks to Wendy Brown’s (2015) recent scholarship on 
neoliberalism in order to explain the idea that “neoliberal governance eviscerates, or swallows, 
the very democratic space in which people assemble to articulate common claims of freedom, 
equality, and justice” (Althanasiou 2018: 17). Moreover, the values of democracy become 
destabilized as the normative mode of reason emphasizes the economic vitality of the subject. In 
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this environment, the democratic values of freedom and equality give way to more inequitable 
capitalist subjugation.  
The state’s legitimization of itself in neoliberal management of crisis attempts to stabilize 
the public good through securitization of particular persons. As an exclusionary force, the state 
produces enemies from whom the public needs protecting. These enemies are often those who 
are dependent on would-be social welfare programs and are therefore posited as undermining the 
economic provisions which the state does possess. Anthropologist Catherine Besteman describes 
this scenario as one “that scapegoat foreigners and the poor as economically unproductive and 
dependent, exacerbating xenophobia and narrowing the boundaries of who qualifies as worthy 
citizens” (Besteman 2016: 198). In this sense, abjected groups become a foil to the public good, 
in order to distinguish from what “worthy citizens” need protecting.   
In the case of Greece’s overlapping crises, refugees and immigrants are easily abjected as 
threats to the system on both a level of political policy as well as normative, social values. As 
articulated by Alexander Aleinikoff (1995: 263), in neoliberal management of global refugee 
crises, “refugee law has become immigration law, emphasizing protection of borders rather than 
protection of persons” (cited in Besteman 2016: 64). Instead of resettling refugees or facilitating 
integration into host or third-party countries, protracted situations increase as camps become 
overcrowded and stays become prolonged. Even with the protocol of EU-Turkey deal in place, 
there is a continuous instability of crisis management. In place of concern for individual 
protections of a person recognized as an asylum seeker or refugee, the management of the 
refugee crises has focused on the safeguard of Greece’s, and Europe’s, borders. With Greece’s 
containment policy that prevents people from moving off of the islands and to the mainland at 
their own volition, the overcrowding at Moria and other camps has resulted in dangerous living 
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conditions. The biopolitical power of the state that regulates the life and death of individuals 
overlaps with neoliberal policies that deincentivize welfare systems. 
In this way, the Greek state holds the power to “define who matters and who does not, 
who is disposable and who is not” (Mbembe 2003: 27, cited by Butler and Athanasiou 2013: 20). 
For Achille Mbembe in his theory of necropolitics, the sovereign’s power to determine 
disposability incorporates but extends beyond Foucault’s argument of biopolitics, highlighting 
the systemized abjection of particular bodies (Mbembe 2003).  Migrants and refugees who are 
relegated to the hotspot islands in Greece or are kept into protracted limbo on the mainland are 
confined on physical, social, and political levels. In 2015, the media coverage and global news 
reports of people coming to Greece’s shores was headline news, whereas today, nearly four years 
later, reports have dwindled. A recent report by the Guardian at the end of February 2019 
referred to situation in Greece as being “increasingly viewed as a forgotten refugee crisis” (Smith 
2019). Though the numbers of individuals arriving to Greece has decreased, the flow of people 
coming to Greece in search of asylum and refuge has not stopped. As public visibility of the 
refugee crisis falls, the disposability of migrants and refugees through a lens of necropolitics 
increases. Lives that are unaccounted for or the neglected number of people who have drowned 
on the dangerous journey to Greece exposes the vitality of refugees and migrants as not only 
economically precarious and socially vulnerable, but politically dispensable. And, “as long as 
bodies are deemed disposable, found discarded, and remain uncounted, the notion of 
disposability will be associated with the concepts and practices of dehumanization and 
necropower” (Butler and Athanasiou 2013: 147).  
The securitization of the physical borders of Greece and the EU that takes political 
precedence also extends to the abstract boundaries of Greek and European culture. The identity 
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politics which take place within the public sphere manifest themselves on both sides of the 
political spectrum. Bodies on the Left and the Right, and even the Far Right, have taken to the 
public arena of debate in contestation of both the economic and the refugee crisis. 
Demonstrations in Greece, and in Athens in particular, occur often, be it in the city’s central 
Syntagma Square or the anarchist neighborhood of Exarchia. The mobilization of bodies across 
the political spectrum has increasingly clear visibility within the public sphere. Living in Athens, 
I noticed an agonistic space of debate in Greece, both in the social and political realm of 
discursive frameworks, and also in the physical space of the city. The collective movement of 
people towards the city’s streets and central squares demonstrate the space of protest and debate 
within the broader public.  
The economic crisis, which took hold before 2015 and the beginning of the refugee crisis, 
opened the door for the emergence of protest and resistance. Though educated, young middle 
class participants were some of the most common bodies in protests and assemblies, a “plural 
embodied space of discontent” was still representative of a general Greek population that was 
affected by crisis (Athanasiou 2018: 22-3).  The development of spaces opened for contestation, 
in addition to the neoliberal European economic and social formations, shaped the space for 
agonism in the public sphere. In the wake of the recent refugee crisis, the public response to the 
migrants and asylum seekers that arrived in Greece varied across the political and social 
spectrum. The already existing procedure of debate in the public sphere stemmed from a 
neoliberal management of the economic crisis and an austerity-ridden Greece. Discussing the 
ability for migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees to enter into this debate, and to express agency 
on more general terms, can begin by turning to the preexisting elements of both the response to 
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the economic crisis in Greece, an existing asylum crisis (see Cabot 2014), and the social 
dynamics of Greek hospitality culture.  
Publics Right and Left 
	  
Within the broader umbrella of the public are overlapping and varying strains of publics 
that are integrated both into and by normative frameworks. These frameworks include bodies 
that fall along a Right-to-Left political and social spectrum. On the Left, solidarity and socialist 
movements counter those on the conservative and even the Far Right. The rise of neo-Nazi party, 
Golden Dawn (Xrisi Avgi), over the last ten years has encouraged anti-immigrant sentiments in 
Greece, and has even resulted in violent attacks against migrants, immigrants, and other abjected 
bodies. The group propagates white-supremacy ideologies, targeting immigrants, LBGTQ+ 
communities, and religious and ethnic minorities. Its public campaign platform in the 2012 
elections was “So we can rid this land of filth” (Elgot 2014).  
Since its political visibility began to rise since the economic collapse, the Greek 
government has attempted to limit Golden Dawn’s activities. As of 2019, the group is currently 
involved in an on-going trial to determine whether many of its members belong to a criminal 
organization and if Golden Dawn can be classified as such. Despite the mounting pressure to 
crackdown on the group, in 2019 Golden Dawn held seventeen of the three-hundred parliament 
seats in Greece. The radical Right, neo-Nazi agenda within the public sphere is reaffirmed by 
their political representation. Golden Dawn is able to perform both socially in demonstrations or 
public in spaces, and politically, as a voting party represented in parliament. In particular, the 
premise of Golden Dawn’s agenda is one that “converging with the neoliberal market economy, 
hinges upon a biopolitical logi(sti)cs of human disposability” (Athanasiou 2018: 24). 
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Emphasizing that vulnerable and abjected bodies are problematic and even dangerous, while 
simultaneously undermining the neoliberal neglect of social-welfare programs, Golden Dawn 
hosted a “Greeks only” soup kitchen in Spring 2013. Even though this effort was condemned by 
the mayor of Athens, Golden Dawn’s foothold in public and political discourse highlights the 
way in which narratives, across the spectrum, have emerged in the wake of crisis.  
On the opposite end of the spectrum, solidarity initiatives have taken hold as a 
predominant mechanism that undergirds traditional, institutionalized frameworks for providing 
assistance to migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. Katerina Rozakou has written extensively 
on the landscape of Greece’s refugee crisis, and in particular, the emergence of the “solidarian” 
(allileggyos) as opposed to the neoliberal production of the volunteer (ethelontis) (Rozakou 
2016, 2017, 2018).  Contextualized in Greece’s history of Europeanization, and in particular over 
the last two decades with its induction into the EU, the bureaucratic and neoliberal agenda of the 
EU is reflected in the institutionalization of volunteerism (Rozakou 2016). Within the milieu of 
Greece’s culture and the hierarchal dynamic of hospitality (see Herzfeld 1980, 1987, 1992) is 
neoliberalism’s moral production of the citizen (Rozakou 2016:82).  
In the case of volunteerism in Greece, Rozakou (2016) argues that the disinterested 
citizen works voluntarily in the interest of the common good and is an example of a subjectivity 
that is vested in a neoliberal project. Contrasted to the volunteer is the emergence of solidarity 
networks, centered on the social community and working toward more lateral and egalitarian 
relationships. Rozakou writes that in their work solidarians, “more than providing aid through 
material goods or services, their intention was to engage in social relationships with the refugees 
they met and to subvert the dominant hierarchical schemata of humanitarianism” (Rozakou 
2018:100). This sentiment was echoed by a social worker I met in Athens, who told me that 
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solidarity movements have a “purer cause” than types of volunteerism and that “solidarity is 
about being human and help another human because this is what makes us what we are.” On the 
other hand, volunteerism is more about having some previous work experience and wanting to 
continue to build that experience. Speaking to the connection Rozakou draws with neoliberalism, 
volunteerism emphasizes more neoliberal values of incentivizing personal skill and experience, 
rather than the experience of connecting with others on a lateral level.  
In the recent years since the economic crisis, the word allilegyos (solidarian) that has 
integrated into the Greek vernacular exemplifies the “reconfiguration of the conceptions of the 
notions of ‘social’” (Rozakou 2018: 189). Springing from anti-austerity solidarity organizations, 
the notion has expanded to solidarity with refugees, migrants, and immigrant groups in Greece. 
Solidarity with migrants in Greece began before the current refugee crisis. There was a standing 
asylum crisis in Greece (Cabot 2014) and policies such as “Operation Xenios Zeus” in 2012 
highlighted the government’s detention and deportation of immigrants (Rozakou 2012, 2018). 
The role of filoksenia, literally “love of the stranger,” implies a power dynamic between host and 
guest not always realized in the English word “hospitality.” As Rozakou (2018:193) points out, 
“the stranger is socially acceptable as long as his/her difference does not threaten the host in a 
setting where the ‘other’ is perceived as a threat to the principle of ethno-culture similarity 
(Papataxiarchis 2006:33-39). The host himself/herself holds the monopoly of agency and 
power.” She further highlights Papataxiarchis’ argument that the rise of austerity measures and 
economic instability opened the door for groups like Golden Dawn and other forms of hate and 
violence against migrants (2018:194). The rejection of the ‘other’ (Papataxiarchis 2014) and the 
pronounced hold on power of the host/hostess over the stranger is exacerbated by prolonged 
modes of crises.  
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Counteracting this, however, are groups of solidarians that emerge to dismantle the 
exclusionary and hierarchal power dynamics of Greece’s “crisis of hospitality” (Papataxiarchia 
2014, cited in Rozakou 2018). Instead of the “host himself/herself holding the monopoly of 
agency and power,” solidarity focuses on lateral relationships, not only addressing but also 
including those with which they stand in their demonstrations and messages. These messages, be 
in the space of public protest, on signage, or in the community centers and squats in Exarchia, 
are often not only in Greek and English, but in Farsi, Arabic, or Urdu. The community center 
where I spent time in Athens in 2018 was built on values of solidarity. It stressed non-hierarchal 
operations of the building that included more than just food and shelter services, but community-
oriented classes and shared spaces. The emphasis on localized support and community opens a 
space of inclusive visibility, where the individual wants and needs of members-- be it refugees, 
migrants, asylum seekers, citizens, or bodies from abroad that come to work in these solidarity 
spaces—are registered.  
These solidarity initiatives differentiate themselves from the type of humanitarian work 
by NGOs, which “many assumed to be institutionalized, well-funded, well-resourced 
organizations” (Cabot 2018: 15). Yet, as Heath Cabot points out in her recent work focusing on 
“solidarity clinics/pharmacies” in Greece, these initiatives have had to collaborate with NGOs 
and other humanitarian organizations, and thus, reluctantly, “participated in instantiating 
hierarchies of ‘deserving’ or ‘needy’ persons and populations” (2018: 16). While refugees are 
often recipients of the services provided by “solidarians,” Cabot points out that the overlapping 
crises in Greece has produced a precaritization of both the citizen and the “other,” and the 
“emergence of new categories of needy subjects amid the entwinement of humanitarian and 
neoliberal logics under austerity” (2018: 18). Cabot’s scholarship highlights two facets of a 
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discussion on agency and the public sphere in Greece. The first is the distinction that solidarity 
groups define themselves against traditional humanitarian organizations in order to emphasize 
and resituate the power relationship between giver and receiver. The second is the way in which 
neoliberal crises management posits both citizens and non-citizens on a spectrum of precarity, 
from which vulnerabilities and struggle can become a shared experience. Within the public 
sphere, a space is opened for the mobilization of these groups.  
The Social and the Political  
	  
The type of debate that exists within the public space is, to an extent, an illustration of the 
overlap of the “political” and the “social.” The distinction of the bios and the zoe which Arendt 
outlines in The Human Condition (1958), and which Agamben (2005) draws on for his argument 
about the state of exception (see Schmitt 1985), is relevant to the discussion of agonism in 
Greece’s public sphere. Arendt and Agamben aptly acknowledge the collapse of the bios and the 
zoe, looking at the biopolitical power of the state and its inclusion of private life functions within 
the political, public realm. Yet, as the current Greek crises demonstrate, the agendas of 
conversation in the public are not so easily demarcated by the categories of public and private. 
The consequences of strict austerity measures and the reduction of social welfare programs blur 
the boundaries between what is rendered private and what is seen as public. As Seyla Benhabib 
makes clear, what sets the agenda for debate in the public sphere is not just a sorting of public 
and private matters, finding clarity between the two, but primarily “a struggle for freedom and 
justice” (Benhabib 1992: 94). Contestation of practices and policies in a democratic public 
sphere is a struggle not only for stable livelihoods, but also a struggle of access to these 
livelihoods. Arendt’s understanding of the public as a political space of contestation is connected 
to the relationship of power and people. An Arendtian understanding of agonistic agency to 
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contest within the public sphere does not entirely account for the power discrepancies of bodies 
within the public sphere and political arena. While contestation is a crucial procedure to be held 
within the public, the capacity of agonistic agency is a conditional one; not every body is an 
equally singular one. In other words, various intersubjectivities within the public sphere affect 
access to the procedural ability of struggle itself.  
In a certain sense, democratic space is emboldened by those who contest it. Yet, in 
another, the agonistic space that emerges from the emergency is still somewhat exclusionary. 
This is to say, that even amidst the pluralities present in public discourse, the voices that resonate 
within the public are those that are already recognized by it. The racialized and scapegoated 
bodies that are abjected from normative discourse form counterpublics, dissecting the broader 
understanding of the public sphere into overlapping domains of included and excluded voices. 
The totality of the public sphere is broken down by Michael Warner (2002) into publics 
(singular, a public) and counterpublics. The public is constituted by the continual reinscription 
and interpellation of subjects to iterative, normative frameworks. A vital underpinning of both 
publics and counterpublics is that there is a sense of relations among strangers, a bond of 
belonging with others whom one has not met and may never meet, but are participating within 
the same public; it can be the shared sense of struggle and precarity that emerges in the wake of 
crisis.  
The common visibility and common action shared by bodies within a public is predicated 
on an application of Althusser’s notion of interpellation (Warner 2002: 58). Because Althusser’s 
concept applies to individuals, not necessarily publics, a modified rendition of his theory can be 
applied. People are always already subjects of state discourse (Althusser 1971); those whom are 
included within particular publics are always already subjects of normative discourse. Neoliberal 
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governmentality interpellates subjects as competitors for (economized) vitality and stability, 
while at the same time abjecting precarized bodies to violence and injustice (Athanasiou 2018: 
27).  
Variant publics emerge from this abjection that negotiate the economization of politics 
and morals. Groups that run counter to these publics, aptly called counterpublics, are exposed as 
frictional forces against the dominate public, opening shared spaces that diverge from the 
banality of normative narratives. Counterpublics are inherently oppositional in the sense that 
they resist the interpellation of subjects into the existing ideological apparatus. Further, 
counterpublics “challenge modernity’s social hierarchy of faculties [do so] by projecting the 
space of discursive circulation among strangers as a social entity” (Warner 2002: 87). In other 
words, the various networks that are negotiated through counterpublics emerge from normative 
crisis frameworks, socializing strangers that share precarized vulnerabilities, and giving rise to 
debate and protest in contested public spaces. Bodies that share vulnerability and precarity, 
“performativity unsettle the gendered, classed, and racialized norms of admissibility through 
which the neoliberal and neoconservative nation-in-crisis constitutes itself” (Athanasiou 2018: 
27). 
The narratives and publics which materialize and mobilize are often attributed with a 
sense of agency (Warner 2002: 89). In other words, publics can be thought of as agentive, 
ideological bodies that negotiate their goals within the public sphere. Golden Dawn as a public, 
in this sense, engages with the public to criticize immigration and reject vulnerable bodies that it 
sees as undermining a Greek way of life. Yet, it is important to note that this attribution of 
agency to publics can result in reductive reification. It is not so much that participation of a 
public in the public where attention should be drawn to agency, but rather, to the participation of 
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individuals within a public. This distinguishes the difference between ideological forces that 
result in particular action, versus the individuals within a group that participate in particular 
ways. The emphasis and accountability should be on the latter. In that sense, the network of 
strangers who constitute a public participate through their own choice actions. Collective agency 
is a result of strangers working in concert, not only action through unified public ideology.  
 This notion is particularly important when examining the agency of refugees in Greece. 
Essentializing refugees as a group that acts neglects the agency of individuals or collectives 
within an ascribed category. Further, the interests of refugees and migrants that are represented 
by those within the public, particularly groups on the Left, speak not only to the existence of 
agency, but the process of its expression. Refugees and migrants themselves are most often 
excluded from the dialogue of the public sphere socially, politically, and physically. The public 
not only works to edge out the voices that would rattle its normative system, it does not register 
them as viable participants in the public dialogue. There are, however, instances where these 
counterpublics break through. Moreover, groups that advocate for refugees, like NGOs that write 
to the Greek government or solidarity organizations that organize public protests, are 
representatives of the interests of those excluded from the dialogue. While many migrants, 
refugees, asylum seekers, and immigrants live on the mainland, the government’s containment 
policy has stranded almost 15,000 people on the islands. This measure inhibits not only physical 
mobility, but social and political visibility. Moreover, the discourse that exists within the public 
sphere communicates via normative speech, an integrated vernacular that allows those within it 
to understand each other. Migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, though excluded from this 
normative language, are still speaking. It is not so much about giving a voice to the voiceless, or 
even amplifying these voices; it is about reconfiguring the speech which is already integrated 
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into the public’s vocabulary to include the voices which is currently excludes. Judith Butler 
(2011) aptly asks a question relevant to this argument: “How do we make sense of those who can 
never be part of that concerted action, who remain outside the plurality that acts…what political 
language do we have in reserve for describing that exclusion?” (cited in Athanasiou 2017, 301).  
 Those who do speak in terms of normative frameworks are included as participants in the 
public. In fall 2017, when nineteen human rights and humanitarian NGOs wrote an open letter to 
the Greek government insisting on better conditions and policy changes on the hotspot islands, 
the conversation that took place between the government and the non-governmental 
organizations was held within the normative framework of the public. Although the 
government’s response in terms of policy change was limited in scope and did not meet all of the 
requests of the NGOs, the procedure itself is a reminder of the types of conversations that are 
able to take place. In this case, the interests of the NGOs expressed in the open letter were to 
better the conditions for the asylum seekers and migrants which they serve. The ability of the 
NGOs to converse and contest in the public sphere by the means of writing fell within the 
parameters of the public’s discourse. NGOs as organizations fall within the framework of 
traditional humanitarian operations— formal, and funded, groups from whom self-identifying 
solidarity groups differentiate. The ability of the NGOs open-letter to resonate within the public 
sphere speaks to their already institutionalized means of communication. 
If refugees and migrants, as individuals or a group, had written a letter to the Greek 
government in the same manner, what would the result have been? To a degree, the practice of 
open-letter writing and access to public forums, particularly on the internet, is indicative of a 
normative procedure in itself. Therefore, are excluded voices relegated to a realm of public 
participation only insofar as existing normative procedures allow? The letter itself acknowledged 
	  
76 
	  
“the efforts of the Greek Government and the solidarity of the Greek people towards asylum 
seekers and migrants in the past years” (IRC 2017). It went on to say, “However, the 
disappointing lack of real solidarity and commitment to responsibility sharing by many EU 
member states is no justification for the current state of asylum seekers on the Greek islands.” 
The signatories on the letter included prominent international aid organizations such as Amnesty 
International and Oxfam, as well as more local groups that ground their work more toward the 
end of solidarity, such as Lesvos Legal Center and Solidarity Now. The groups oriented toward 
solidarity efforts, while echoing the sentiment of realizing lateral relationships as opposed to 
hierarchical dynamics of charity and volunteerism, collaborate with traditional humanitarian 
organizations in order to break through into the public dialogue.  
 There is a particular part of my discussion that I have presupposed so far in this chapter. I 
have posited agency as embedded in a framework that is reliant on the breakthrough of 
counterpublics and dissident voices that find pathways to emerge in the public. In the case of 
refugees and migrants in Greece, I do not mean to speculate that agency has a teleological end 
that assumes collectively conceived wants and needs. The necessities of safety, security, and 
stability are sought after not only by refugees and migrants, but by general subjects of humanity. 
The particular fabrication of these wants or needs is, however, a subjective one insofar as 
different individuals, collectives, publics, and counterpublics, overlap and seek variant 
embodiments of these fundaments. People leaving their homes and crossing international 
boundaries do so for a myriad of reasons—asylum claims vary, self-presentation and identities 
are not identical, and not all sensibilities correspond in concert.  At the intersections of race, 
sexuality, gender, religious affiliation, nationality, ethnicity, and other contrived markers of 
identity and self, a discussion of agency must remember the way in which power dynamics 
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transform, produce, reduce, and operate. Dualisms that have appeared in this discussion such as 
public and private, life and death, can entangle a discussion of agency in a similar kind of binary. 
Recognizing this, it is important to note that agonism and agency are not homogeneous 
assemblages or harmonized performances that either exist or do not exist. Instead, the public 
sphere and participation in it is a subjective experience, and even when agency is at times 
elusive, it cannot be phenomenologically essentialized as a force to either be possessed or not 
possessed.  
Breaking through into the public is possible by simultaneous actions of presenting both as 
a frictional force to the public and by accessing its permissible channels. As in the case of the 
Moria 35 and other protests of migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees; agency is expressed 
through existing mechanism of debate in the public sphere. The criminalization of individual 
protest conveys the message that the state is attempting to lessen the vocalization of protest from 
bodies it is attempting to exclude. In January 2019, the Guardian reported that a group of 
migrants in Samos marched into the island’s capital chanting, “Samos is no good” (Smith 2019). 
The following sentence in the article reads, “The protest added mounting pressure on the leftist 
government in Athens to move them [refugees] to the mainland.” From the perspective of the 
media outlet, the protest is a recognized as a force that has an effect on the public. By entering 
into the agonistic practices in the public sphere, aided by the visibility of the media and other 
groups that stand in solidarity with them, excluded bodies and counterpublics are working to 
break through into the public.  
◆ 
 Unlike the frameworks of traditional humanitarian organizations or the vertical power 
dynamic embedded in the conventional understandings of hospitality, solidarity initiatives 
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attempt to resituate relationships between giver and receiver. This lateral relationship bolsters the 
agency of the recipient because it not only acts as a means of giving, but rather, works to 
dismantle a dependent relationship on the provider. Not only addressing but including migrants, 
asylum seekers, and refugees in dialogue addressed at the public, solidarians help to take hold of 
the elusive agency that is diminished from the result of neoliberal crises management. Though 
solidarity measures are a step in the direction of enhancing agency, their efforts are not entirely 
removed from the frameworks of power and hierarchy. Though within counterpublics of 
solidarity spaces these relationships are restructured, when entering into the public discourse, 
often times it is through always already channels of normative discourse that the counterpublics 
and excluded bodies must present and communicate. In other words, though solidarity 
encourages the agency of asylum seekers, migrants, and refugees in Greece, it does not entirely 
root out or reestablish public discourse. Nonetheless, it gives room for the reimagining of 
inclusion and agency in the public sphere (see Cabot 2018).  
  Furthermore, solidarity brings into question the boundary of the “social” and the 
“political,” again blurring the agenda for encompassed debate in the public sphere. The emphasis 
on locality and community is evident spatially. For example, many solidarity initiatives and 
collectives have cropped up in the Athenian neighborhood of Exarchia. This idea of shared-ness 
and sociality is also evident as a subversion to the politicalized state. As Rozakou (2018: 199, 
also 2016:82) writes, “it seems that the ‘social’ has become the alternative all-encompassing 
notion that replaces the disdained political.” What is at stake in public discourse is not, as 
Benhabib writes, just the sorting of public and private, but “a struggle for freedom and justice” 
(Benhabib 1992: 94). In the context of solidarity movements in Greece, forms of solidarity 
negotiate within the public arena of debate to resituate previous understandings of the political—
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disinterested, institutionalized forms of humanitarian aid such as volunteerism—to advocate for 
the lateral, egalitarian levels of justice and freedom in everyday life.  
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Conclusion 
	  
In a statement released on the third anniversary of the signing of the EU-Turkey 
Statement, the head of the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) mission in Greece, Emmanuel Goué, 
said, “Greece has become a dumping ground for the men, women and children that the European 
Union has failed to protect…What was once touted as a ‘refugee emergency’ has given way to 
inexcusable levels of human suffering across the Greek islands and on mainland Greece” 
(Médecins Sans Frontières 2019). Though the number of people arriving in Greece over the past 
three years has decreased, the EU-Turkey deal has trapped nearly 15,000 on the hotspot islands. 
The unsafe and unsanitary conditions of the overcrowded camps prompt questions of the 
competency and the role of the state to solve this “refugee emergency.” The situation has 
eclipsed the meaning of the word “crisis,” which, like “emergency,” implies a temporality of 
disorder. Instead, a new normal has taken hold in the form of a worsening protracted situation 
that not only leaves thousands without alternative pathways to safety, but sheds light on the 
issues present in the current International Refugee Regime.   
         In this thesis, I have attempted to open a discussion into various aspects of the current 
refugee “crisis” in Greece by first addressing the construction of the category of the refugee. 
Though a self-declared apolitical body, the UNHCR operates amongst the framework of the 
nation-state system and is reliant on the obligation of signatory states to adhere to its 1951 
Convention and 1967 Protocol. Moreover, the category of the refugee that is both defined by the 
1951 Convention and constructed by the nation-state system paradoxically undermines the the 
“national order of things” (Malkki 1995a:6). The relationship between citizen and state upon 
which the nation-state system is predicated is called into question by the “refugee,” a figure that 
subverts the bond between nativity and nationality, and man and citizenship (Ardent 1951, 
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Agamben 1994). In this sense, the category of the refugee defines what the citizen is by 
highlighting what it is not. While citizenship invokes the recognition of certain protections, the 
marginalized figure of the refugee brings to light the construction of human rights as something 
inherent in a relationship between citizen and state. As Agamben points out, the category of the 
refugee should evoke discourse that is directly geared at protecting human rights, yet it also 
reminds us of the state’s ability to control the administration of these rights, an inclusion under 
and exclusion from the sovereign’s protection (Agamben 2000). 
Agamben brings into questions the concept of bare life and the state’s power to reduce 
one to their basic biological function, stripping them of all political life and even social meaning. 
He argues that the premiere example of this is highlighted in concentration camps, where citizens 
were exposed to the condition of bare life. Agamben discusses the model of the camp, the spatial 
arrangement in which the state has total power, as the paradigm for the modern West. 
Agamben’s theory of bare life and his model of the camp can be examined in a discussion on 
refugees, but not because refugees assume the essence of bare life, nor because the refugee camp 
is entirely analogous to the concentration camp. Instead, the category of the refugee reveals the 
reality of the potential of the state to reduce one to bare life and to physically confine individuals 
within either a spatial and societal marginalization. The “refugee” as a liminal figure is situated 
between the citizen and the homo sacer; while the rights of the citizen are not granted to the 
“refugee,” individuals in this category are not reduced to a body without any social meaning. 
The “refugee” reveals the limits of both citizenship and human rights, as well as the 
limits of an entirely philosophical discussion on its categorical construction. In other words, 
discussing solely the category of the “refugee” can neglect the lived realities of individuals who 
flea across international boundaries, facing dangerous conditions and hostile receptions. Though 
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looking toward a discussion on refugees in a philosophical sense may lead to an ideological 
understanding of the pitfalls of the nation-state system, it also may lead to essentialization and to 
the assumption that all refugees have analogous struggles. Reducing refugees to the status of 
Agamben’s bare life in a philosophical sense perpetuates the construction of a liminal category 
as well as automatically restricts discussion of agency or expression. In the realm of bare life, 
there is an inherent inability to be rendered meaningful, both political and socially. 
Though the growing protracted situation and worsening conditions of overcrowded 
camps such as Moria are reminiscent of the model of the camp and the realm of bare life, the 
lives of refugees, asylum-seekers, and migrants are not analogous to the homo sacer. It is 
important to balance a concern for providing better conditions and greater access to basic rights 
with the acknowledgment that refugees, asylum-seekers, and migrants possess agency. 
Additionally, refugees, asylum-seekers, and migrants are not entirely reduced to bare life—if 
they were, their disposability would be so great that they held no meaning. While these bodies 
are seen as increasingly disposable, and concerningly so, they are not entirely out of the realm of 
discourse or acknowledgment. The situation at Moria and the containment policy on the islands 
is an important reminder of the state’s ability to reduce one to bare life, and raises a call to better 
attend to the needs of these individuals, but to classify refugees, migrants, and asylum-seekers as 
embodiments of the homo sacer would be to confirm a sense of powerlessness. To do so would 
be to entirely exclude them from any recognition of the state at all, when in fact, the refugee 
crisis is in need of the utmost attention.  
For Agamben, who in large part extrapolates from Hannah Ardent, bare life posits “life” 
as the fundamental operational force of the state. While through a Foucauldian lens of biopolitics 
the state’s regulation of life is apparent, it is also important to critically look at the results of 
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“life” itself as the highest good of a state’s political agenda (Owens 2009: 579). In We Refugees, 
Arendt writes, “Brought up in the conviction that life is the highest good and death the greatest 
dismay, we became witnesses and victims of worse terrors than death without having been able 
to discover a higher ideal than life” (Arendt 1961: 266). The “worse terrors than death” to which 
Arendt refers remind the reader of the realm of bare life, a marginalized space in which no 
meaning can be rendered. So what then can be seen as having “a higher ideal than life”? By 
relegating “life” to the principle mechanism on which the state has the power to operate, the 
actions which register in the realm of the “political”—life beyond just biological function, 
imbued with inherent meaning—are limited to the recognition of the state itself. 
While Agamben focuses on this type of power as inclusion through exclusion, turning to 
Arendt can resituate a discussion of the political as it pertains to refugee studies. She writes, 
“politics is not so much about human beings as it is about the world that comes into being 
between them and endured beyond them” (Arendt 2005:175; cited in Owens 2009:578). Perhaps, 
then, we can ask if what is “endured beyond them” is a “transcendence of bare life” (Owens 
2009:578). Is the shared world that is produced through the interactions of groups of individuals, 
even marginalized figures and those outside the purview of the “political,” some kind of politics 
itself? In renegotiating the boundary between the “social” and the “political,” can a “higher ideal 
than life” be found that rests on the shared space and sociality between individuals? Instead of 
focusing so much on “life” as the praxis of the “political,” perhaps the ability to create a common 
world—something that all humans have the ability to do amongst each other—is the point of 
reconfiguration for the “political.” Turning to an approach that emphasizes agency both in and 
out of the public sphere allows for a more layered picture to emerge that highlights on ability, 
action, and sociality.   
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In terms of agency, questions remain unanswered here that are in need of further 
consideration. How is agency itself as the capacity to act related to recognition of action? In 
other words, does recognizing agency give a greater capacity to act? The door towards 
investigating the relationship between agency and recognition is left open and can perhaps be 
further explored through Judith Butler’s critical look at the conditions of recognition, 
apprehension, and intelligibility (Butler 2009). For Butler, recognizing a life is framed within 
particular conditions and facilitated by a set of existing norms. From this understanding, she 
writes, “The problem is not merely how to include more people within existing norms, but to 
consider how existing norms allocate recognition differently… What might be done to produce a 
more egalitarian set of conditions for recognizability?” (Butler 2009: 6). 
Looking at various responses to the refugee crisis in Greece can lend insight into framing 
the conditions of recognizability. Traditional humanitarian organizations that operate on 
hierarchical dynamics are reimagined through solidarity initiatives that are predicated on more 
lateral and egalitarian relationships. Solidarity movements and individual “solidarians” (Rozakou 
2016) give more recognition to agency of refugees, migrants, and asylum-seekers, and these 
initiatives construct greater capacity for agency.  On the other hand, parties such as Golden 
Dawn propagate anti-immigration sentiments that capitalize on the idea of disposability, 
rendering refugees, migrants, and asylum-seekers towards an agency-less end as bodies that can 
be rid from society. To answer Butler’s question— “What might be done to produce a more 
egalitarian set of conditions for recognizability?” —perhaps the answer lies within looking more 
toward initiatives of solidarity.  
         Discussing agency in terms of political intelligibility, breaking into normative discourse 
can occur through existing and permissible channels. For example, the Moria 35 and other 
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protests that occur utilize the open agonistic space in the public sphere. The demonstrations 
themselves, as well as the subsequent arrest of the people involved bring to light the 
breakthrough of these actions into the public. This incites reaction and response from those 
already included in the public and place mounting pressure on the government to react. Further, 
solidarity initiatives work to renegotiate the hierarchical relationships embedded in more 
traditional humanitarian and volunteer frameworks, in turn bolstering the agency of those with 
whom they work. Solidarity movements work to reorient the relationship between the “social” 
and the “political” by resisting institutionalized frameworks of traditional humanitarianism that 
are embedded in neoliberal management styles and create vertical power relations between giver 
and receiver. Instead, solidarity calls upon mobilization of the social, highlighting the notion of 
the collective. Though the “horizontal essence” of solidarity movements are not entirely 
unconditional (see Rozakou 2018:199-200) this approach offers a space of sociality unlike 
traditional humanitarian organizations. Though questions remain pertaining to exactly how the 
spheres of the “social” and the “political” can be be renegotiated, solidarity initiatives give a 
glimpse into the way in which sociality and egalitarian frameworks can highlight and bolster 
agency. 
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